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ABSTRACT 
 
America’s Inconsistent Foreign Policy to Africa; a Case Study of Apartheid South 
Africa 
by 
Olugbenga Samson Ojewale 
   
This study lays bare the inconsistencies in the United States of America’s Foreign 
Policy, and how it contributed to the longevity of apartheid in South Africa. 
Michael Mandelbaum opined that America’s foreign policy post-Cold War era drifted 
from containment to transformation.1 America became involved with transferring their 
democracy and constitutional order to the countries they entangled with in running 
those countries’ internal governance. Instead of war, America preached and practiced 
proper, organized governance. Thus, America’s foreign policy to Europe and Asia post-
Cold War was all about democracy and protection of fundamental human rights. 
However, the role of America’s Foreign Policy in Africa took a turn in Africa, with 
Congo in 1960, Ghana in 1966 and Nigeria with their successive military regimes. This 
study intends to make sense of it all. 
  
                                                 
 
 
1 Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era,  
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2016),3. 
3 
 
 
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
There is no how this Thesis project would have been possible without the 
resoluteness and support of the Thesis Chair and Adviser Dr. Daryl Carter. My utmost 
gratitude to my adviser, who read my various revisions and helped make some sense of 
the confusion. Also, to the other committee members in person of Dr. Henry 
Antkiewicz, and Dr. Elwood Watson who offered academic guidance. 
My utmost appreciation also goes to the Department of History of East Tennessee State 
University for the enabling academic environment, awarding of financial aid, etc. to 
complete my degree and project. And finally, thanks to my parents Dr. Anna Muyiwa, 
and friend Abayomi Thompson who was with me during this process and always 
offering support. 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
           Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. 4 
Chapter 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 6 
2. SOUTH AFRICA AFTER WORLD WAR II, 1948-1994 ......................................... 10 
South Africa and Mining ......................................................................................... 12 
Urbanization ............................................................................................................ 14 
Population Explosion .............................................................................................. 19 
Emancipation ........................................................................................................... 25 
3.APARTHEID AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA ...................................................................................................................... 28 
Segregation Laws .................................................................................................... 30 
The Laws Brought Oppression ................................................................................ 33 
Intervention and Sanctions ...................................................................................... 38 
4. SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COLD WAR PERSPECTIVE ................................. 44 
Violent Protests and Embargo ................................................................................. 44 
The Soviet Factor .................................................................................................... 45 
The Influence of Cold War on South Africa ........................................................... 50 
The US Supports South Africa Against Communism ............................................. 52 
The Soviet Arms Freedom Movements in South Africa ......................................... 56 
5. HARBINGER OF CHANGE: PRESIDENT CARTER LATE 1970’S ..................... 60 
5 
 
 
6. DIVESTMENT: US POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN ............................. 78 
A New Dawn ........................................................................................................... 78 
A New Policy .......................................................................................................... 79 
Reagan in Bed with Apartheid ................................................................................ 84 
Change Becomes Imminent .................................................................................... 85 
Reagan Strongly Denies Supporting Apartheid ...................................................... 89 
Desmond Tutu and Ronald Reagan ......................................................................... 92 
George Bush’s Different Approach ......................................................................... 95 
7. THE FALL OF APARTHEID .................................................................................. 100 
The Historiography of Black Politics During the Struggle ................................... 105 
The Anc ................................................................................................................. 110 
An Alliance for a Common Cause ........................................................................ 111 
The Ideological Shift to Armed Struggle .............................................................. 113 
The Frontrunner of the Struggle ............................................................................ 114 
8. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 118 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 125 
VITA ............................................................................................................................. 138 
 
  
6 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
United States of America is known to be a trailblazer, front-runner and pioneer 
of democracy, rule of law, freedom and respect for fundamental human rights for 
citizens of the world. It is a known fact that the United States of America stands for 
democratic rule which is indeed the face of their foreign policy. Joyce P. Kaufman, in 
detailing and proving democracy as the beacon of America’s foreign policy, quoted the 
arguments of some of the founding fathers of America, especially Thomas Jefferson and 
Alexander Hamilton, on ‘whether the United States be involved with the world or not? 
Is it the responsibility of the United States to help spread democracy?’2 Hence, 
democracy and the rule of law are not just the foreign policy of America but the very 
basis of her existence and history. Thus, America’s foreign policy to Europe and Asia 
post-Cold War was all about democracy and protection of fundamental human rights. 
However, the inconsistency in this famed policy was laid bare in Africa. What America 
preached against and discouraged elsewhere became conspicuously seen in some parts 
of Africa. 
Why America would support sustained anti-democratic and segregationist rule 
throws up many questions which we shall try to answer in this study.  
The inconsistencies in the American foreign policy contributed to the longevity 
of apartheid. For almost fifty years, apartheid thrived in South Africa as the minority 
                                                 
 
 
2 Joyce P. Kaufman, A Concise History of U.S Foreign Policy, New York, Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006.  
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whites controlled the affairs of the southern African nation while maligning the black 
majority, and committing great fundamental human rights crimes in the process. 
Virtually all the American presidents who were in power during the apartheid regime in 
South Africa refused to see apartheid as a fundamental problem, but an opportunity for 
alliance in the Cold War and the war against communism. The country's precious 
minerals, its strategic location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of American 
and the West's policy of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the several 
excuses cited by previous United States presidencies for encouraging the National Party 
of South Africa and its policies in Pretoria.  
This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise in 1994, two years 
after Reagan left office. It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support Pretoria was in 
the interest of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for the indignity, 
pains, and sufferings experienced by the vast numbers of the South African citizenry 
meted out by the apartheid regime; the U.S. government continuously appealed the U.N. 
and the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.  
Chapter Two discusses how WWII affected South Africa. The effects were not 
just social, but also economic as the country embraced manufacturing due to needs for 
various supplies as a result of the war. This manufacturing development did not affect 
the upsurge of the mining and gold industry already established in the country. Many 
blacks were employed in the manufacturing industry during the 1939 and 1945 years, 
and it also discusses the politics behind the after-effects of the war on South Africa and 
the black segregation policy. 
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Chapter Three looks at the role of America with the Apartheid government of 
South Africa, how America never criticized it because of similar policies, like the Jim 
Crow laws, being played out, especially Southern states in America. With trade 
relations and investments in South Africa, cultural exchange, particularly education, 
South Africa and the United States remained strange friends for much of the Apartheid 
era. 
            Chapter Four examines the position of South Africa during the Cold War, trying 
to gain sympathy through the hostility between the Soviets and the United States, with 
clear military backing from the West (despite several political rhetoric and 
condemnation of Apartheid, the US still supplied military hardware and personnel). 
Here we look at if South Africa was really neutral during the Cold War.  
          Chapter Five presents the Jimmy Carter years in relation with South Africa. The 
foreign policy of America’s president, Jimmy Carter to Africa and South Africa, his 
message of peace, accountability and human rights and how it affected South Africa and 
her close neighbors and to ascertain if Carter was true to his message of respect for 
human rights in Africa.   
        Chapter Six looks at America’s relationship with South Africa during the Ronald 
Reagan and H W Bush years, how Ronald Reagan publicly declared that he detests 
Apartheid, yet backed the South African government and even vetoed Congress’s 
sanctions on the South African government. We will also look at Bush’s silence on 
Apartheid and its effects on South Africa. 
        Chapter Seven reviews the process and events that led to the demise of Apartheid 
South Africa. America’s role leading to the climax and the view of the world and Africa 
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on the sad effects and the development the regime brought about. This chapter also goes 
further in analyzing the end of Apartheid through the scholarly contributions of 
intellectuals from both the perspective of white minority and the opposition. It is thus 
appropriate to cram this chapter with the historiography of black politics.                                     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SOUTH AFRICA AFTER WORLD WAR II, 1948-1994 
One can say that South Africa is known for racial hostility. Known mixed colors 
with wonderful people and diverse cultures.3 Its very existence has been shrouded in 
conflict, with the inter-white conflict between the Afrikaners and the British imperialists 
resulting in the South African War of 1899-1902, splitting allegiance and sympathy 
between Americans. The Afrikaners and their allies could not contain the British, and 
with a British victory, the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.4  The British 
Parliament in 1910, approved the Union of South Africa to become an independent, 
autonomous state within the Commonwealth and made Louis Botha the Prime Minister 
of South Africa under a parliamentary system of government, with blacks having the 
privilege of becoming representatives only if nominated and supported by whites.5  
By 1919, the first prime minister had died and Jan Christiaan Smuts had taken 
his place. Smuts got South Africa into WWII on the side of the Allied forces against 
Germany raising about 350,000 soldiers after the initial reluctance of volunteers to join 
                                                 
 
 
3 Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, Cultures of the World:South Africa (New York, 
Marshall Cavendish, 2004), 5. 
4 Gann Lh and Duignan Peter, Hope for South Africa? (California, Hoover Institution 
Press, 1991), 138. 
5 Rosmarin, Rissik, Cultures of the World, 25. 
11 
 
 
in the war. South African troops bombarded and recorded a victory against the Italian 
army which had occupied Ethiopia.6  
South African influence rose with the military exploits of the country in WWII. 
At the outbreak of the war, the South African troops rallied by Smuts were significant 
during World War II as the infantry soldiers courageously stood their grounds in 1941 
alongside the "British Eight Army in the Sahara Desert" against the renowned German 
corps. Smuts ensured South Africa played a pivotal role during the second world war, 
contributing not just its quota, but being an influence not just in southern Africa, 
demonstrating that it is not a pushover across the whole of Africa. South Africa’s 
influence and Smuts’ was reckoned with after the war, Smuts was officially recognized 
for his efforts in the times of war and thereby made a Field Marshall and became 
instrumental in forming the United Nations.7   
The troops from South Africa though minimal were able to make an immense 
contribution to the success of the Allied forces. Smuts’ doggedness paid off as South 
Africa’s participation in the war ensured that the Mediterranean was reopened as 
                                                 
 
 
6 Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, Cultures of the World: South Africa (New York, 
Marshall Cavendish, 2004), 25. 
7 Rosmarin Ike and Dee Rissik, Cultures of the World, 25. 
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enemies of the Allies were chased out of Africa in a victory for the Allies.8 Citizens of 
other African countries came in large numbers into South Africa as a result of the war. 
The population explosion indeed impacted South Africa in a positive way as labor for 
its manufacturing industry could be had cheaply, which in fact, made its industries to 
thrive. 
South Africa and Mining 
Indeed, one of the factors that served as a draw for the influx of people into 
South Africa was the mining industry. During the war and after, there was a surge in the 
economy of South Africa as need for weaponry and ammunition to be manufactured 
arose and because of thriving industries such as mining, especially gold and other 
minerals. For these reasons, as a result of the war, people moved from other countries to 
South Africa for economic reasons and to get urbanized. Post-World War II had people 
moving into South Africa seeking employment into the manufacturing industry as the 
labor force had also improved by 60%. Between 1950 and 1980 South Africa witnessed 
an industrial boom as the country had more products being manufactured as commerce 
picked up in the region. It was then imperative that these thriving industries attract 
                                                 
 
 
8 Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid 
(Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 2015),115. 
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workers from neighboring countries, especially the ones displaced by World War II.9 
With new industries like the chemical and plastic industry springing up to be added to 
already strong and thriving industries like the metal and engineering industry, these 
years witnessed not just the growth of the new industries, but the consolidation of the 
old ones to become even bigger and stronger.10 
There were diverse reasons which made the industrialization of South Africa a 
strong and viable one. The fact that cheap labor could be got with relative ease, access 
to cheap, affordable energy and the South African government’s committed policy to 
the growth of industrialization in the country coupled with the funds got from the 
successful gold industry all helped to make industrialization successful in the country to 
the point that the country was to be known widely as a manufacturing one.11 South 
Africa became a manufacturing country and an exporting one. Gold being the major 
export of the country, many countries relied on the manufacturing industry of South 
Africa as the country became a superpower in commerce as trade relations with Great 
Britain and the United States of America continued.12 South Africa witnessed an influx 
of people from other regions in Africa due to the draw of its manufacturing industry, 
                                                 
 
 
9 Iliffe John, Africans:The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
280. 
10 Iliffe John, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
280. 
11John, African, 274. 
12Ibid, 274. 
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which picked up from the time of World War II and its sustained need for products to 
be manufactured and continued after the end of the War to become the mainstay of the 
South African economy. 
Urbanization 
Contributing also to the population explosion which impacted South Africa after 
World War II was the effect of the war on neighboring countries of Africa. People were 
displaced from their homes, living in terrible conditions, malnourished, impoverished, 
ravaged with sicknesses and diseases. They had no choice than to move South, because 
of the better standards of living. With the war having a devastating effect on their 
country, government and most importantly, resources, these displaced numbers had no 
choice than to move to South Africa, which boasted a stable economy and a thriving 
industry that assures employment, they did not mind the fact that at the helm of affairs 
of the country they had chosen to move to were of European descent they simply 
wanted to survive, wherever, however.13  
South Africa thus affords them the opportunity to be urbanized, to move from 
their towns and villages, to live their lives in urban centers again, with opportunities to 
feel the hip and funky lifestyle and get to improve the economy of their families. 
                                                 
 
 
13 Erlmann Veit, Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers' Isicathamiya 
Performance in South Africa, 1890-1950 (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 2014), 
200.  
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Africans were motivated to move to South Africa because the War did not affect its 
economy and cities. 
The cities of South Africa served as a draw for other Africans as the influx of people 
into the country continued after the war.14 The nationalism that came to fore as the 
movement of other African people into South Africa began, especially rural, 
impoverished people moving into the South African urban centers arose because of the 
mixture of cultures of urban life and the rural settings. The rural immigrants saw the 
way of life of the urban, dropped theirs and imbibed the culture of urban lifestyle.15 
This saw the population of blacks in South Africa pick up considerably as more blacks 
poured into South African cities after World War II.16  
With blacks moving in their numbers into South African cities and urban 
centers, cities like Johannesburg and Cape-town felt the effects the most as they became 
the biggest cities in Africa due to this urbanization and the thriving manufacturing 
industry in the country.17  
                                                 
 
 
1412 South Africa-The Impact of World War II. The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 5 May 2014. www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017 
15 Erlmann Veit, Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers' Isicathamiya 
Performance in South Africa, 1890-1950 (Illinois, University of Illinois Press), 2014, 
200 
16 South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of 
April 2017. 
17 South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of 
April 2017. 
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Simply put, highlighting the effects of World War II on South Africa would be 
incomplete without recognizing factors like urbanization and the fact that people had to 
move south because they did not have a choice as there was nothing left in their own 
countries to live for or live on as a result of the war than to move south. What was 
intriguing was that despite that these people knew that South Africa was governed by a 
white minority, the perceived reason they became homeless and incapacitated in the 
first place, yet they migrated to South Africa anyway, placing economic gains and 
survival over whatever hardship and abuse they may encounter in the country.18  
The new manufacturing industry of the post WWII threatened the already 
established mining and in particular, the South African Gold industry. The government 
clung to their gold and did not allow manufacturing to affect or kill that industry. On the 
outside, the world saw South Africa as the new emerging manufacturing powerhouse 
with a declining gold reserve, while South Africa saw itself as juggling the two, 
refusing to let slip its export in gold and equally maintain its immense rise in 
manufacturing.19 This is obvious and a no-brainer since the country gets two-third of its 
Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) and three-quarter of its earnings from gold 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
16 Erlmann Veit. Migration and Performance, 200  
. 
19 South Africa-The Impact of World War II The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., 
n.d. Web. 5 May 2014. www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of April 2017. 
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export.20 Increased population after World War II also affected the South African 
economy in that more hands were available to work in the mining industry. Regardless 
of how dangerous the mining job was, and how tedious the working condition was, 
there were instances where immigrants had to work two miles underground and 
temperature reaching 104 degrees with the prospect of getting the miners killed, the 
immigrants still would work hard and give their best because for them, the conditions 
were better.21  
This development brought about the early days of gender equality in South 
Africa as Xoliswa Vanda emerged as the first black woman to get a blasting certificate 
in gold mining in South Africa.22 As with the change in every society, this development 
did not go well with male workers in the industry as they found it strange taking orders 
from a woman there was little they could do though as Vanda was in charge of financial 
resources and even their safety at the mines.23 Post-World War II had so much effect on 
South Africa that in the post-war years the country recorded increase in GDP to up to 
6% a year, which at that time was an immense achievement, considering it being the 
                                                 
 
 
20 South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com, accessed on 24th of 
April 2017. 
21 Reader John, and Michael Lewis, Africa: (Washington, National Geographic Society, 
2001), 305. 
22 John, and Lewis, Africa, 305. 
23 Ibid, 305 
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war years.24 On the whole, World War II impacted South Africa positively as the 
country experienced an economic boom. With about 1,129,000 African people moving 
from their primitive farming industry into the urban cities of South Africa to move into 
the mining, engineering and manufacturing industry of the country as labor hands.25  
The effects of the War would also result in the migration of millions of other Africans 
into South Africa with the promise of a better life and oddly, made the lives of South 
Africans better for it as the South African government came up with innovations 
socially and economically to better the lives of its citizen.26 Another effect of World 
War II on South Africa was the spectacular shift from agriculture and country life to 
industrialization and urban life. After the war, as a result of people moving en-masse to 
South Africa from neighboring countries who were affected by the war, when other 
Africans saw this trend, they decided to follow suit and move into the urban centers of 
the country. The farm hands who served as labor for the white supremacists and their 
plantations also gave up on the farms and moved to the cities for a perceived better life 
                                                 
 
 
24 Iliffe John, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
280. 
25 Iliffe, John, Africans: The History of a Continent, 280. 
 
26 South Africa-The Impact of World War II The Great Depression and the 1930s. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 5 May 2014. 
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for themselves, an action that had a serious effect on the white lords and their 
economy.27 
Population Explosion 
 The action of the farm laborers to leave the farms and move to the cities for 
better jobs was as a result of the poor remuneration from their jobs as farmhands in the 
suburbs. The laborers once on the farms were badly paid and lived on about 20Euros a 
year, which made them very poor and their lives very miserable.28In these 
circumstances, eventually something had to give, and when the trend of urbanization 
began, the farm laborers downed their tools and moved to the urban cities to better the 
conditions of their families and themselves. 
  
                                                 
 
 
27 Iliffe John, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
273. 
28 John, Africans: The History of a Continent, 274. 
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Table 1. Population Censuses of 1936 and 194629   
                                      1936                     1946                        1936                  1946 
                                Numbers in thousands                      Percentages of totals       
Whites 2003 2372 20.8 20.9 
Africans 6596 7831 68.6 68.8 
Coloreds 769 928 8.0 8.1 
Asians 220 285 2.3 2.5 
  
                                                 
 
 
29 B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 
108. 
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A look at the population census when these years are compared sees a change in 
proportions, highlighting trends exposing a cause and effect, obvious from the war. We 
see an annual increase in the population of the Afrikaners, with it being higher than the 
minority of the British descent. Africans that were urbanized during and after World 
War II rose to 24.3% in 1946 compared to 19% recorded back in 1936 before the war. 
This shows that the difference in population between 1946 and 1936 of those who 
moved up to the cities to have a taste of the urban lifestyle.30 
Spectacularly between 1939 and 1945, Africans who worked in the South 
African manufacturing industry rose to about 245,400 from the initial 156,500, which is 
about a 57% improvement from years gone by before the war.31 Change as brought 
about by the war continued and was visible as the cities got fuller and fuller with 80.8% 
of the ‘urbaners’ employed as unskilled labor while about 34.2% of them were semi-
skilled, with only 5.8% being regarded as skilled labor.32 This development, a system 
overloaded with Africans becoming the spine of the labor force in the urban industries 
brought about a restructuring with the ‘majority’ blacks as the heartbeat of the making 
of the thriving economy, but separatist whites as the administrators and rulers of the 
‘heartbeat.' The racist leadership of the day decided that to protect its interest as 
minorities, apartheid had to be enforced and made legally binding for it to take full 
effect. This new policy had a euphemism of ‘separate development, but it was not long 
                                                 
 
 
30 B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985,. 
108. 
31 Ibid,108. 
32 Ibid,109. 
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for it to be recognized as what it really was, an advancement and success for the 
minority white and a bleak future for the Africans.33 
This process changed South Africa as it became autonomous and less dependent 
on imperial Great Britain, with its access to more capital as a result of its economic 
boom through its industries. The urbanized African labor as a result of it being cheap 
and accessible became a key cog in the wheel of economic prosperity for South Africa 
and could not be dispensed with.34 In effect, World War II brought the apartheid policy 
on South Africa. Apartheid became a necessity as a factor of the effects of the war on 
the country. The white minorities had to do something drastic to maintain their 
‘superiority’ and control. Thus, apartheid was the answer to the puzzle. Little wonder 
when the Purified National Party emerged as the new leadership of the country and 
introduced full-scale apartheid, giving the nonwhites no voice to air their frustration, the 
party did not bring in anything new but consolidating on the segregationist policies and 
practice that was already in effect before they came into power.35 Inevitably, the 
protests started ringing out from the non-white community against the system and the 
apartheid policy. That within the framework was not out of the ordinary. What was 
noteworthy was the fact that the protests became efficient. The non-whites became 
                                                 
 
 
33 B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 
109. 
34 B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985,. 
109 
35 Ibid, 109. 
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radicalized in solidarity, militant even, as they said ‘no’ to all manifestations of 
apartheid and economic relegation.    
The years during and after post-World War II saw a significant increase in the 
protests of the African majority as about 304 strike actions were carried out over low 
wages and better working conditions against just 107 in the years before the second 
world war.36  The non-whites continued to defy the racist, minority whites even as they 
were humiliated, harassed and banned. About 58,000 non-white majorities still were 
able to carry out strike actions and stayed committed to their radicalism to make their 
voices heard.37 This culminated in 75,000 mine-workers downing tools in 1946 because 
of decrease in wages, though were beaten back to work by the government.38 
Everywhere in the cities, there were reasons to protest as the significant number of 
people who migrated to South Africa and flooded the urban cities were welcomed by 
the government because they were seen as cheap, affordable labor for the thriving 
manufacturing industry.39  What was odd and concerning was that the South African 
government did not make provision for accommodation for them, making most of these 
lot live in shacks, huts and under terrible conditions.  
                                                 
 
 
36B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by UNESCO at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 
115. 
37 B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. 
Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 115 
38 Ibid, 116. 
39 Ibid,119. 
24 
 
 
After the second World war II, a renaissance of sorts was experienced in the 
moribund, old ANC (African National Congress)  as Dr. A.B Xuma was elected the 
party’s president in 1940. His election though did not start the era of fiery oration and 
political militancy and struggle, yet started a chain of events that did culminate in the 
formation of the youth wing of the ANC called the Youth League.40 These set of young, 
vibrant and intellectually sound activists emerged to change the face of the ANC and 
the political history of South Africa. Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and 
Govan Mbeki among others were a unique group of upstarts who were ready to take the 
party beyond the inactions of the old guard of the ANC and Xuma, its leader. They 
believed the era had gone beyond keeping it simple in order to make a difference and 
bring back sanity in racial relations back to their beloved country they believed a long 
battle in militancy, in solidarity with the protests in the urban centers that already 
picked up and gathered pace to make a difference. The protests ongoing in the urban 
cities and towns had become something daring and innovative. Bus boycotts seeing 
thousands prefer to trek miles to and from work instead of paying the astronomical fares 
asked of them by the apartheid government became the order of the day, along with 
struggles against the laws.41 
In this new daring era of protests and militancy, new townships and peri-urban 
settlements came into existence. As a result of immigration, rural settlers came to the 
                                                 
 
 
40B. Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the symposium 
organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 
1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1985, 
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city and built settlements and squatter towns in open fields and did not yield to the 
oppression of the police. Soweto and Mpanza’s town-a town ‘built’ on an open spread 
of land close to Orlando where some of these kinds of settlements.42 The young 
members of the Youth League consolidated on the protests of the Africans and armed 
with their realization that a great struggle is what would liberate them from the shackles 
of the white minority, built on it and launched their own campaign moving away from 
the sheer prudence of the ANC leadership and embracing militancy as the engine that 
could drive them towards achieving their aim.  
Emancipation 
Moving forward, the most significant effect of World War II on not just South 
Africa, but the whole of colonial Africa, on the whole, is that the war presented 
Africans the opportunity to see the vulnerability of the colonial masters and thus push 
for independence from them. Political freedom, a situation almost deemed impossible 
(at least before the war), almost unthinkable, was able to be achieved across Africa as a 
result of the war running the European Imperialists ragged and making it quite difficult 
for them to hold on to their colonized territories. Great Britain and France were hard hit 
by the war and paralyzed economically. They had used up economic and human 
resources in the war effort and still not got victory. These powers now looked less super 
in the eyes of Africa and facing up to these masters suddenly became less of suicide and 
more of picking up the courage to ask for what rightly belonged to them; a right to be 
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governed by themselves. So, the colonized Africans no longer saw the masters as 
invincible or gods they are human after all and also feel what every human feels.43  
That the colonial masters made the Africans look like they were children who 
could not act nor reason like adults was not unusual, at least to the Africans, what was 
unusual to them and at the same time became an eye-opener for them was the way the 
Africans contributed to the war and fought courageously as adults. This, coupled with 
the war experience of the Africans as they fought side by side with their superior 
colonial masters during the war and saw the supposed superior white man being scared 
of death in the line of fire changed the mentality of the Africans toward the white 
supremacist and gave them belief that freedom was feasible if they asked the right 
way.44  
However, the position of South Africa was unique when compared to other 
colonized Africa. South Africa had never been completely run by ‘whites with a mother 
country in Europe.’ The whites in charge of running the Union of South Africa were 
whites who had settled permanently without the prospect of going back ‘home’, they 
were South African nationals who knew no other home. Hence the need to rule with 
racial intentions to protect this minority group, using the resources of the millions of the 
majority blacks to their own economic gain.45 Yes, the common advantage of political 
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emancipation for black Africa got from World War II impacted South Africa, but in a 
different way. 
To conclude, World War II had a lot of effects on South Africa. It did not just 
bring about freedom from Great Britain for the Union but also revolutionized the nation. 
The impact of WWII reverberated for decades as South Africa innovated in industry, 
embraced manufacturing, with the displaced from the war producing cheap labor for the 
thriving industry while not neglecting the mining industry as gold became their chief 
exports. Urbanization was also achieved as the groundwork for Apartheid was laid and 
effected as a result of effects from the war. Apartheid will now be fully treated in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
APARTHEID AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Apartheid translates as "apartness" or "separateness." In addition to denoting 
spheres of physical and social demarcation it carries with it a sense of moral and 
spiritual imperative. The apartheid concept first emerged in the context of discussions 
by Dutch Reformed Church missionaries in the 1930s, only gaining wider political 
currency in the 1940s. In 1943 'Die Burger', the Cape-Town based Africanner 
newspaper described apartheid as "the accepted Afrikaner viewpoint". The following 
year, Malan, as leader of the opposition, deployed it for the first time in the South 
African parliament. Later in 1944, Malan explained that apartheid was not the same as 
the existing policy of segregation which denoted separation in the sense of "fencing 
off". Instead, he characterized apartheid in more positive, totalizing terms, as a means 
designed to "give the numerous races the privilege of uplifting themselves on the 
conditions of what is their own.46 
Apartheid was the institutionalization of policy and program of racial 
discrimination in South Africa. It became the implemented strategy and the national 
ethic of South Africa in 1948, when the National Party displaced the elder statesmen of 
Afrikanerdom and brought a unique vigor and vengeance to racial politics that would 
mark the next forty years. But the National Party put into law, and carried to 
extraordinary extremes in both theory and practice, what was in fact a long history of 
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racial discrimination, brutality, and deprivation that had marked South Africa from the 
first day of colonialism.47 
The most common description for South Africa's political system before 1994 
was "an apartheid practice." While the National Party governments of South Africa 
claimed to be representative of a westernized democracy, their claim was said to be 
generally found to not be true on theoretical grounds. The apartheid system negated 
many components of democracy since it was ethnically based and divided the South 
Africans into four races: white, black, coloreds and Indians. It excluded most of the 
population from political participation so that they lacked representatives who could be 
held accountable. The system also denied black human rights to the majority, as citizens 
of the state, since there were different degrees of citizenship (white versus coloreds, 
Indians, and black), and because the black majority enjoyed the lowest degree of 
nationality. In the proposed tri-cameral reform system of the 1980s, the Indian and the 
coloreds were granted a higher degree of citizenship compared with the blacks.48 
The period between the Boer War and the National Party victory in 1948 saw 
consistent repression of blacks, Indians, and the coloreds, though with some outwards 
signs of negotiation or moderations. Mohandas Gandhi began his struggle in South 
Africa for equal rights against British rule, suffering the same alternating pattern of 
audience and prison he would later experience in Indian. In 1912, John Dube and Albert 
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Luthuli formed the African National Congress (ANC) to press for the black rights. For 
years the ANC sought to obtain these rights through peaceful protest and petition. All of 
this, however, yielded little fundamental change. In 1913, a law was enacted formally 
denying blacks rights to the land they once controlled, and they were instead pressured 
onto “reserves,” the precursor to the later “homelands.” The law restricted the 
movement of non-whites and job preservation protected supervisory, managerial, and 
almost all skilled jobs for whites. Political rights for nonwhites were virtually 
nonexistent.49   
Segregation Laws 
The South African Apartheid laws came into effect as an implied law at the 
beginning of the slave trade in the seventh century with about 25 million Africans sold 
into slavery for the next 12 centuries.50 Although, it was in 1948 that the South African 
regime launched out fully on the Apartheid laws starting with the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act of 1949, which made it an offence against the state for people of 
different race to get married and raise children.51 
The act affected families in South Africa after 1949, but the effect was minimal 
compared to the devastating effects it had on families and mix marriages which had 
already been standing before 1949. This situation affected the children of mixed race 
marriages that were standing before the Act was passed into law in 1949. Cases sprung 
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up where children of the same parents were deemed and classified as different race. 
Instances sprung up where a child would be deemed Colored while the brother or sister 
would be classified as white. A typical example of this was the case of Vic Wilkinson, 
who was initially classified as ‘mixed race’, later referred to as ‘white’, then changed 
his status to ‘Colored’, became ‘white’ again, and finally was classified in 1984 as 
Colored. One cannot imagine the discrimination and hardships as early as the 60s and 
70s that this legislation brought upon South African families. So to speak, it brought 
division in many families and resulted in mental and emotional torture.52 
Following this was the Population Registration Act of 1950 which expects 
everybody to be tagged according to their race, either black, white colored, or mixed. 
To make this happen, it was imperative that the appearance of the individual be 
considered. The ‘pencil in the air’ test was invented to determine who was who. The 
South African government under Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, who was first Minister of 
Native Affairs, before becoming the Prime Minister of the regime, oversaw his officials 
placing a pencil in the hair of people to be determined their race. If the person’s curly 
hair could hold the pencil as he bends over, then he is declared colored, but if the pencil 
falls out, he is declared black.53 The classification along racial lines also featured along 
with the texture of hair, color of hair, facial features and the general complexion of the 
skin. This often became complicated and confusing, and shattering, as there were 
                                                 
 
 
52 John Allen, Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of 
Separate Development, (New York: IUniverse Inc.2005), 76. 
53 Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years, (New York: Bantam, 1997), 21.  
 
32 
 
 
incorrect determination of race, which left many families divided as some colored 
children were classified white and in some cases blacks branded as colored, with a lot of 
children becoming outcasts in the process.  
The 1950 Immorality Act which forbade any sexual interactions between the 
different races of South Africa was tepid, and many South Africans was amused at it and 
deliberately flouted those rules, to go ahead and mate interracially just for the thrill of 
defiance at the laughable attempt of the authorities in trying to bend the rules of nature, 
and general human behavior:54  
If the Immorality Act was awkward to the citizens, the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950 was not. It gave room for zero different, 
distinctive opinion of the regime on Communism. The citizens had no 
right to call for change, or see differently on the issue of communism. 
Police would brutally descend on anyone whose opinion was different 
from that of the regime. The Act banned parties like the Communist 
Party of South Africa which was communist centered and other pro-
communist ideologists in a bid to dissuade them completely from 
communism. Defining communism as any idea that seeks to effect 
change, industrial, political, economic or social, or disrupting the status 
quo. The South African government was so in bed with the west that it 
was desperate to discard with communism, meanwhile also using the Act 
to clamp down on opposition, as anyone deemed ‘communist’ was first 
given a two-week appeal, then prevented from politics or participating in 
public affairs to being kept in solitary confinement and being jailed.55  
 The apartheid government of South Africa diverted national and international gazes 
from the genuine reason for frowning at racism and the deprival of fundamental human 
rights by pointing fingers at the black movements and labelling them as communists 
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because they were supported by the Soviet Union.56 Taking advantage of the cold war, 
indeed, both the ANC and Umkhonto Ze Sizwe in the eye of the apartheid South 
African government are external Soviet agents, and not just taking up arms and 
canvassing for social, political, and economical involvement like they really were.57 
The Laws Brought Oppression 
This oppression by the apartheid regime forced the pro-equal rights for blacks 
organizations like the ANC and PAC underground with their activism. They were 
continually oppressed and brutalized, which ironically led them to get funding from the 
Communist Party.58 The non-whites were discriminated against further with the 
regime’s Bantu Authorities Act ‘helping them to be able to vote by creating 
“Bantusians”, “homelands.”59 Between 1958 through 1966 the homelands came to 
accommodate blacks and colored. It created an avenue for the blacks and colored with a 
dwelling place to vote, making it impossible for them to vote in the “White Parliament” 
while also losing their citizenship.60 Not contented with just breaking the citizens into 
racial lines, the South African regime also divided the non-whites into four homelands, 
namely, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.61 This cruelty by the regime to 
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displace the non-whites from their inheritance and frustrate any hope that they may 
nurture in affiliating with the National Party, and also rid them of citizenship affected 
the non-whites terribly. In driving home the displacement, then minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, Dr. P. Mulder stated that, "If our policy is taken to its 
logical conclusion as far as the Black people are concerned, there will be not one black 
man with South African citizenship...Every Black man in South Africa will eventually 
be accommodated in some independent new state in this honorable way and there will 
be no longer a moral obligation on the Parliament to accommodate these people 
politically."62With the pretext of establishing an hierarchical succession system of 
chiefs appointed by the regime with the aim of giving governance back to the traditional 
natives, which the real motive was to cause ethnic differences and divisions.63 
There are countless more laws that made it so obvious that the non-whites were 
different from the whites. Extending even towards segregation in employment, and in 
public places. It was impossible for non-whites to work where whites work, with the 
only exception being in rare occasions when the blacks worked for the whites.64 
Gordimer and Goldblatt in driving this point home shares the experience of a young 
girl, who said, “we were made to walk, not smile, to not do anything that look like we 
were having fun. They treated us like animals. To them, we were. It was just the way 
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things had to be, we did not understand.”65 The Apartheid laws became so barbaric and 
racial that it soon became a way of life for the non-whites. They were not allowed to 
smile, nor have fun, nor even acknowledge themselves as humans. The non-whites were 
made to become second fiddle, second citizens, or ‘non-modern citizens’ at all, as they 
were deemed not civil enough to live in decent homes. The nightmare of legislation and 
prejudice of the 60s and 70s consigned the homes of non-whites to suffering, in mental, 
psychological, and intellectual proportions.66  
The Separate Representation of Voters Act mixed up non-whites’ more than a 
hundred years voting rights and placed it on a roll in the Cape. After shifting the 
‘judicial goal post’ several times, the Act was eventually revalidated in 1956, 
successfully getting rid of non-whites from common ‘voters roll’.67  
Then came the Native Law Amendment Act which ‘criminally’ redefined 
‘natives’, declaring the ones who were fit to live in towns, and the ones who were not.68 
It also compelled all blacks to be with a means of identification all the time, carrying 
with them, a pass, which bears identification parameters like, record of employment, 
photograph, tax record, place of origin, and of course, any criminal record. The 
regime’s definition of criminal record was as discriminatory as it gets, as “any 
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encounter with the police” was a criminal offence.69 By late 1950s Apartheid South 
Africa had mirrored the United States of America’s Jim Crow laws, only surpassing it 
by establishing several legalized laws that made it an act of breaking the law for any 
citizen deemed ‘Colored’ to “walk on a Whites Only beach”, “walk through a Whites 
Only door”, or “ride on a Whites Only bus”.70  It became a crime to be outside on the 
streets after 11pm, you would be a criminal to not have your passbook on you, and also 
a criminal to have the passbook wrongly signed. It was considered breaking the law to 
be without a job, and also a crime to seek employment in the wrong, no-go areas. It was 
considered breaking the law to not have a place to live in, and also to live in a place 
considered illegal. It was almost considered a crime to be black or non-white.71 That 
was the extent of the racial, discriminatory laws of the Apartheid regime.  
The outstandingly shocking Bantu Education Act passed in 1953 set up a black 
curriculum tailored towards educating the blacks with their ‘nature’ and ‘requirements’ 
in mind.72 Hendrik Verwoerd felt it useless and time-wasting to allow non-whites gain 
education that would get them ambitious enough to want to lay claims to positions in 
the regime meant for the superior whites, and that would not be available for them to 
attain anyway. So the blacks were to be educated in skills that would make them 
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suitable for homeland use, or better still, to prepare them for excellent service as 
laborers under the superior whites.73 Similar to this act was the Extension of University 
Education Act, which made it utterly impossible, and banned black students from being 
enrolled in white universities. The Prohibition of Interdicts Act made it a crime to 
contest forced removals in the courts of law, while the Native Labor Act made it an 
offense for blacks to embark on strike actions.74 
Generally, as a black person you had to accept whatever comes to you, typically, 
mostly, bad things of course, without complaints, and bad blood. This was the situation 
with blacks under the Apartheid regime of South Africa. 
As if these were not enough, the Sabotage Act of 1962 trumped the rest of the 
racist laws yet as it became outright criminal to sabotage the regime. ‘Sabotage’ being 
defined as “trespassing” or being in possession of ammunitions. The regime also 
subdued and prevented the younger generation from getting familiar with the activism 
of people like Nelson Mandela and his colleagues by placing on ban, the reproduction 
of the voices, or quotes and statements of someone already banned by the regime.75  
The notorious General Law Amendment Act in a bid to suppress the furtherance 
of communism, gave the regime the allowance to declare associations like Poqo, Yu 
Chi Chan Club, the Congress of Democrats and, Umkhonto we Sizwe as criminal and 
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illegal.76 Further empowering the police to arrest with a warrant or not for crimes as 
suspicion of a political crime, they could detain the suspect for ninety days without trial 
or an attorney as the regime deem fit.77 With the discrimination against the blacks, 
South Africa became isolated, abandoned and shunned, like a leprous by the world due, 
heavily to its legalized racial policy-apartheid.  Apartheid comes to mind as one of the 
worst crimes against humanity of the 20th century. Televised evidence of the apartheid 
regime's barbarism was viewed by the West, and Europe of course, every day. P.W. 
Botha, then prime minister of South Africa, enforced a 'state of emergency in July 
1985', giving his administration sweeping powers that effectively placed South Africa 
under martial law.78The administration of The National Party of South Africa which 
was in power between 1948-1994 in 1948 imposed Apartheid on the country, which 
made nations world over, in turn, implement sanctions on the regime. 
Intervention and Sanctions 
 The United States of America in 1986 finally joined the world in imposing 
'economic and diplomatic sanctions' on the Apartheid regime. The United States of 
America had been engulfed with winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union, so 
believed limiting the presence of the Soviets in Southern Africa would help their 
cause.79 The United States administration saw Apartheid South Africa as an enigma. In 
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explaining the position of the South African government, the regime was seen by the 
United States as a wall that stemmed the advancement of communism; due to its 
location, being on the Cape Sea Route, blessed with rare minerals, it also housed a lot of 
United States diaspora companies that found the South African market profitable.80  
An appraisal of United States Governments' response to the beginning of the 
regime in 1948 to its end, showed that while they all mildly castigated the anti-human 
rights policy of apartheid. United States' Presidents did not entirely condemn the 
prejudiced government of Pretoria by enforcing complete economic and diplomatic 
penalties on the South African administration. Officials of the Democratic Party and 
those of the Republican time and time again did not get the hang on stable the white 
rule is, how the resistance of the black majority had garnered strength and how 
considerable the presence of the former Soviet Union and Cuban government 
involvement in the region was, which had equally damaging consequences.81 
Successive American Governments would always reply that the blacks suffering from 
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apartheid would be the ones to suffer if they did decide to impose sanctions, when 
probed as to why they failed to impose sanctions. Thomas Borstelmann postulated that, 
although the United States officials knew the ills and effects of apartheid and its neglect 
of human rights, Harry S. Truman’s government in particular (1945-1953), was 
reluctant to scold the South African government as uranium ore needed to boost the 
American nuclear system can be found in abundance in South Africa, as well as other 
mineral resources. Borstelmann also confirmed that other factors like the economic 
advantage of trade relations, the South African army's participation in the Korean War 
and the regime's dedication to containment made it easy for Truman's government to 
look the other way as regards apartheid.82  
Nonetheless, the U.S. kept the diplomatic ties with the apartheid regime intact 
throughout the period of apartheid. As a matter of fact, the U.S. became Pretoria's 
second biggest trading partner. Also, the United States became its second largest foreign 
investor, and the source of one-third of its international credit by 1985.83 Going 
forward, South Africa powerfully assisted the United States and the west's resistance to 
communism and decided to stifle the increasing presence and rise of communism in 
Southern Africa, as these Southern African countries emancipated from foreign rule to 
autonomy.  Under Richard Nixon's government (1969-1974), a thorough study of the 
United States' policy to Southern Africa branded 'National Security Study 
Memorandum 39' was produced, which will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
Under Jimmy Carter’s government (1977-1981), the United States got stricter toward 
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the apartheid South African government, seeing the rise of African nationalism and 
awareness as a useful tool in Pretoria in aligning with the best interests of the United 
States.84 It is ironical that despite Ronald Reagan’s administration (1981-1989) being 
the toughest yet on the apartheid regime, more than any other president; it was indeed 
his government that impacted and would change the relationship between the two 
governments. 
To elucidate, in the 1980s, the anti-apartheid movements in the United States 
and Europe gained momentum and support for sanctions against Pretoria, and for the 
detachment of United States companies from the apartheid region. However, in spite of 
the increasing domestic and worldwide movement to depose the regime, during this 
difficult time, President Ronald Reagan kept a strong relationship with the South 
African government that was showing no signs of any reformative policies or sanctions. 
As a matter of fact, through Reagan's administration, he devotedly was for the apartheid 
regime at the helm of affairs in South Africa. In 1981, President Reagan told the late 
Walter Cronkite, who was a reporter for CBS, that he was friendly toward the South 
African government as South Africa was a country that has stood by the United States 
of America in every war they’ve ever fought, it was a nation that, strategically, is 
important to the free world in its production of minerals.”85 After that chat with CBS, 
President Botha of South Africa responded the following day that: To learn that the 
forerunner of the new world order understands and know the strategic grandness of 
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South Africa is gratifying.86 He continued by saying that South Africa appreciates this 
understanding of proactiveness and welcomes it. President Ronald Reagan supported 
the apartheid South African regime publicly, making the South African leader, Prime 
Minister Botha look like a liberal who was willing to review the policies and support 
the U.S. in resisting communism interests in Southern Africa.87  With this public 
solidarity by the Raegan's government, it is not but awkward to note that it is the same 
South Africa that sanctioned its majority from suffrage, refused its major population 
fundamental human rights and clamped those were brave enough to question its policies 
and request sanity to the madness, in jail. It is not startling to realize that Reagan only 
ceded and joined the West and the world in renouncing Apartheid South Africa after six 
years as president. To be specific, until 1986, when the U.S government slapped the 
South African government with economic sanctions, the government of Ronald Reagan 
committed itself to standing by its resolve that the change that South Africa needed 
would eventually be put in effect by the regime itself.88 
With the white Apartheid regime going all out to enforce barbaric laws that 
obviously consigned every other race, particularly the majority blacks, to the 
background and make them forever inferior to the minority whites, it is to be noted that 
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the United States of America missed the chance to serve as the umpire who would have 
regulated the laws and stand up to the regime in favour of the maligned blacks in 
sanctioning the regime, and fighting the cause of the majority blacks to uphold the 
fundamental human rights spoken of with glee in Washington. Rather, Washington 
placed the victory over the Soviets in the Cold War over the moral, human fight for the 
blacks, and backed the South African racist regime in perpetrating the inhuman crimes 
against its black majority because of the regime’s unwavering opposition to 
communism.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COLD WAR PERSPECTIVE 
The 1960s was an explosive period in the annals of apartheid South Africa. 
Great Britain as the colonial master started transferring power to African nationalists, 
starting with The Gambia in 1957, then Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ghana. In 1960, 
France gave up control over their colonies in West and Central Africa.  Also, Belgium 
withdrew from Congo (Zaire).89  In South Africa, the decade opened with the 
Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960.90 Lots of folks lost their lives when they had 
a protest, albeit peaceful, the protests were to question the laws on passbooks.  This 
resulted from the harsh pass laws that passed by Hendrik Verwoerd's National Party.  
He resumed the 1930s pro-racist reconstruction right with the world watching and 
intensified racist policy by moving the black majority on to Bantustans and regulate 
them using passbooks, a major source of insult and contention for black South 
Africans.91        
Violent Protests and Embargo 
As well as passing even more racist laws and Bantustan regulations, the white 
minority who controlled the racist government of South Africa banned the Pan-African 
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Congress (PAC) and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC).  Capitol Hill was 
shocked by this decision, deciding that it was best to place Pretoria on the UN Security 
Council's agenda permanently.92  Kennedy also set up a highly selective arms embargo 
one full year before the UN.93(SACP) The South African Communist Party, the African 
Nationalist Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) by 1961 all 
abandoned the peaceful resistance earlier used to combat pass laws by embracing 
violence to make their grouse known.94 The No. 76 of 1962 of General Law 
Amendment that gave the allowance to repeat jail term to 90 days with no trial was 
added to legislation by the white-controlled South African regime because the parties 
refused to back down on the rate of violence.95  By 1967, laws were passed that allowed 
detention without trial for indefinite amounts of time. 
The Soviet Factor 
 The South African regime laid the chunk of the violent protests employed by 
the banned ANC, PAC, and SACP at the feet of the communist Soviets, in a bid to court 
favor and goodwill from the U.S. and the West, as well as to get the United Nations off 
their backs. The South African government used this ploy to court the favor of the US 
by taking the side of the US in the cold war by labelling the banned parties as 
sympathetic to the Soviets. This made the Union look civilized and stabilized, 
irreplaceable and calculated before the U.S. and the West, and also tried to make them 
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understand the need to uproot these groups causing chaos and influencing its citizens 
negatively.96Looking at the influence of the Soviets and communism in the Union, a lot 
of historians believe that the realness of the danger of the Soviet was not much. As most 
of the extent of Soviet communism threat was a propaganda whipped up by the 
leadership of apartheid South Africa to gain the support and consideration of the US and 
the west, some contested that indeed they had minimal impact in the area, declaring that 
though the "Cold War paradigm was a myth," it didn't mean that leaders of the National 
Party, Botha and Malan did not truly believe that they were fighting on behalf of 
western countries' interests.97  The government of South Africa did fear for the Soviets 
filling the space left by the departing colonial masters, even as they watched Portugal 
lose its footing in Africa towards 1974, by drastically impacting the geographical 
advantage the South African regime enjoyed between them and other African countries 
not linked with a western colonial juggernaut of some dimension.     
Although the Soviets did play around in Africa, giving weapons out through 
East Germany to the opposition uprisings in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, the 
Communists were not as threatening than the event of a rebellion by a black majority 
against a fairly small South African white minority.98 It is not like there was no link 
with the ANC, SACP, PAC, and the Soviets. A connection indeed exists between these 
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South African political groups and the Soviets, but it was not a big harmful link Pretoria 
painted before the United States of America. Sub-Sahara Africa and the early Soviet 
Union indeed had a small link which dates back to 1921, the time the Communist Party 
of South Africa (CPSA) had representation in Comintern, later replaced by Cominform 
after WWII.99  When African nations started claiming independence in the 1960’s and 
freshly found political parties showed interest in developing their societies around 
socialist ideals, Khrushchev responded with enthusiasm.100  Khrushchev, unlike his 
predecessors, was more interested in Africa, Khrushchev attended the UN to welcome 
the sixteen newly admitted African states in the summer of 1960.  He liked the idea of 
the anti-imperialist fire of the first generation of African leaders and wanted to 
capitalize on it.101 
There are a variety of views on the level of importance and aid the ANC, and 
SACP received from the Soviets. The Soviets massively impacted the ANC and really 
were responsible for supporting their battle with the South African government and 
keeping the groups going, especially after the Massacre at Sharpeville. The ANC and 
SACP got trained in guerilla warfare by Moscow in Minsk and Belarus.102 They also 
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requested weapons and received them through Dar es Salaam and Maputo drop 
points.103 The ANC was "never actually a complete Communist puppet, but it was 
heavily sustained by the Soviet support and KGB back channels."104 
 What did assistance from the Soviets look like? In the 1960s, Communist 
Soviets began giving aid to the local SACP and ANC. Much of the assistance was given 
to the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), known as the armed wing of the ANC 
and SACP.  In 1963, the ANC got $300,000 in aid from Moscow, while the SACP got 
an addition $56,000.105 Moscow was able to train the ANC in their camps in Zambia 
and Tanzania in 1964. Going further, there is little to corroborate this information. He 
posited that the instructors from Moscow did not start showing in ANC camps till 
1979.106  However, from 1963 -1991, over 1500 ANC activists did get trained in Soviet 
military institutions.107           
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The Cold War 
The Cold War had an enormous impact on the modern world, with virtually 
every part of the world involved in this ideological tussle between two great 
superpowers and the ensuing battles that followed this competition. This worldwide 
tussle tremendously impacted Southern Africa. It is established that beyond question it 
had a complex negative consequence for Southern Africa and its people in the south of 
the continent. The Cold War enmity helped set in motion the anguish of Southern 
Africa for thirty years, and it became an important ideological front in the foundation 
for the white-minority regimes and the various liberation struggles. The both of them 
exploited this ideological competition for their selfish interests, but in the end had 
different objectives. The Cold War tensions provided an opportunity for the belligerents 
to legitimize their acts. In the bid to make these aims a reality, Southern Africa 
experienced a lot of destructive wars which invited interventions from both the United 
States and the Soviets and also from different countries supporting either power; 
prompting guerrilla revolts in several nations, and the policy of Pretoria of 
destabilization against its autonomous neighbors blocked the political and economic 
advancement of Southern Africa. Many of these legacies are still evident in Southern 
Africa today.108 
The Cold War was diffused with many dialogues between the U.S. and the 
international community, especially the Third World. South Africa would also witness 
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this norm. Instead of responding to the direct menace of the Soviet impact, the U.S. saw 
in Pretoria an important launch pad for its Navy and an environment for its space 
program to thrive, thereby ensuring the U.S. turn a blind eye to the antics of the racist 
apartheid regime and sympathize with the regime. In the 1960s and early 1970s years, 
the United States' foreign policy towards South Africa regarding the Cold War can be x-
rayed through three different means. The three points were the docking of the USS 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1967, the American government using satellite and 
missile tracking ports in Johannesburg by NASA between 1960-1973 coupled with the 
ban on arms that Kennedy instituted, which was implemented by Presidents Johnson 
and Nixon from 1963-1970. These instances, as found in the U.S. National Archives, 
are close examinations of how Washington carried out policies that affected the 
government and people of South Africa.109 Especially as regards worldwide Cold War 
and as regards apartheid, is important so as to really understand the impulsive 
component describing how the United States related to the international community in 
the crucial phase in World History.110      
The Influence of Cold War on South Africa 
During the Cold War, Pretoria was not the best of an ally. Supporting the 
government in Pretoria was a tough decision for Washington, being friends with a 
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regime that treated her citizens with contempt and terror was always going to be a big 
risk, a risk they decided to take considering the huge benefits taking the side of Pretoria 
would bring. South Africa with its geographical location and its political shape, was 
blessed with ports that are equipped with innovative technology for Sea and Space, 
which were cogent to the United States' course. So, Washington had to consistently 
decide the kind of ties they had to float with Apartheid South Africa and the best way to 
reach the desired balance internationally and at home.111 
The Cold War was a difficult period for the U.S. The Cold War was a rivalry of 
two ideological and political arrangements. It was a war which pits communism against 
socialism with economic gains behind the motive. It was a race to determine which 
nation was more developed scientifically, militarily, and regarding nuclear power. A 
war to see who would have superior geographical dominance, economic power, and 
political might among non-aligned states. The Cold War in the Southern African region 
possessed a particular dimension which differentiated it markedly from the battle of 
systems and ideas in continental Europe. This was a direct product of the particular 
socio-economic development of South Africa, and it's associated class structure which 
was indelibly linked to racial discrimination and exploitation. Despite the socialist 
Bloc's enduring faith that the march of history was on its side, the residual strength of 
the white settler regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia following the collapse of the 
Portuguese Empire in 1974-1975 which saw the Portuguese army defeated by 
nationalists in its African colonies, prolonged this contest and gave anti- colonial 
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struggles a particular intensity. These white minority governments used the perceived 
threat of communism, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, to demonize African 
Liberation movements and to divert domestic and international attention from the real 
causes of opposition to the racist rule. 
Synthesizing the consolidation of economic and specific meaningful pursuits 
that the U.S. administration had with Pretoria, with the advancement of the Cold War 
and the beginning of the Civil Rights movement and an examination of American aid 
for the racist white minority regime of South Africa and also for the colonial masters of 
the rest of Southern Africa thrust forward space on the difficult juxtaposition of two big 
topics of the annals of contemporary America: racism and anticommunism.112 The U.S. 
used Southern Africa countries of Angola, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and of course, 
South Africa as an experiment to know if it would be possible to strike an alliance with 
the third world in fighting against the Soviets. 
The US Supports South Africa Against Communism 
The Truman government provided invaluable aid to help implement white 
dominance and authority in South Africa after the second world war in its desire to stem 
the spread of communism and to preserve the ‘free world. 'The United States became, a 
reluctant uncle- or godparent- at the advent of apartheid.113 The Truman government 
doubted the South African blacks and their ability to install a South Africa free of 
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Soviet dominance, which was mighty important to the United States for different 
reasons, particularly for some raw materials Pretoria possessed. When Afrikaner 
nationalists just without question categorized everybody, who opposed apartheid as 
"communists, " and Truman did not bother to question the legitimacy of the claim 
seriously.114Ideally, Truman believed his chances were not much and did not know who 
to back in South Africa in stemming the propagation of Soviet impact, so decided to 
support the white minority, a decision he felt in his gut was the best for the United 
States then.   
 This led to a flaw in the coherence of the United States' multiracial politics with 
its relations with the Southern African region as the US believed supporting white 
minority leaders will keep the Southern African states in check. There was the concern 
that "the leaders in Moscow had started to entertain much more interest in advancing 
their impact and making it felt south of the Mediterranean Sea. The United States 
believed that once any racial strife is encouraged, ‘it would enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc 
opportunity in Africa.'"115 President Kennedy's policies towards Pretoria would continue 
to matter and even transcend to through to the Johnson and Nixon's administrations. His 
primary strategy was to choose "staunchly anti-Communist white rulers" against 
picking the majority black ANC or PAC, in spite of fears of how the civil rights 
movement in the U.S. would react.116  
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The years between 1960 -1970s was characterized by policies and relations 
between Pretoria and Washington being steeled by the fear of communism spreading 
through the impact of the Soviets. Another school of thought believed the marriage of 
convenience between the U.S and South Africa from the angle of how apartheid 
influenced United States' establishments that have links to South Africa, like churches, 
educational institutions, private businesses, civil rights leaders, and diverse leaders from 
the United States' administration. With the administrations divided and divisive, the 
United States presidents were too preoccupied with the influence that the South African 
government wield, and were sensitive enough to want to keep them as an ally in their 
bid to better the Soviets during the Cold War than to be bothered about the maligned 
black majority going through hell under apartheid South Africa.  
The American government was scared that a revolt in the Southern African 
country would give room for communism to creep in, thrive and take control of the 
southern sea routes and the leading light in the supply of gold world over.  Washington 
read while their knees balked, the reports from CIA that communist Soviets had 
infiltrated the ranks of the ANC. The focus of the cold war thereby changed-, with 
every intelligence report warped into believing any opposition to apartheid or 
colonialism an act of support towards communism.117   
While not necessarily being entirely focused on why the U.S. parleyed with 
South Africa in the manner it did, the expansion of communism, by the Soviets, in 
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South Africa was the foundation on which the government based its decisions so 
brought about a positive change for the maligned blacks of South Africa. Considering 
that “…Kennedy simultaneously affirmed the legitimacy of the apartheid government, 
not because the Cold War left him no other choice but because that was the only choice 
his administration was willing to see.”118  The U.S. did assume that the ruling racist 
South African regime was the only one to go with when an ally was to be picked among 
rival political parties as they were seen as the logical, safest option in the ideological 
battle against the Soviets.     
 Ultimately, South Africa's projected image as the ‘bastion of the free world' did 
not compel the West. The unbelief of the west was based on the argument that what the 
Soviets sought by projecting naval power in distant waters was political influence rather 
than the means to provoke a military conquest of the West. The West recognized that in 
the improbable event of a shoot-out in the southern oceans, the Republic's anti-
Communist posture would leave it little choice but to place its ports, harbors, and 
military facilities at the West's disposal.119 In trying to focus on the effort to involve 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War, the cash-strapped Soviet Union tried to stay ahead 
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of the game, even as former African colonies gained independence.  A primary tool of 
the USSR was to distribute forged letters to leaders of the blacks in Africa that were 
"designed to strengthen their suspicion of the United States and their trust in the Soviet 
Union."120      
The Soviet Arms Freedom Movements in South Africa 
 The Soviet's interaction with the ANC and SACP, more specifically, even 
though Moscow had "only minor expectations of the possibility of national freedom 
movements" in South Africa, they felt that it was pertinent to keep ties with the 
movements that stood against apartheid and may really come to power if there comes a 
forceful takeover.  In spite of the ANC and SACP receiving a small amount of funds to 
the tune of 300,000 a year to the ANC alone, "the first fifteen years of Umkhonto 
operations posed no significant threat to the South African apartheid regime."  This was 
mainly due to the mass exile and imprisonment of ANC and SACP leadership.121  
 About 328 Umkohonto fighters were trained by the Soviets in Odessa from 
1963-1965.  The Soviets believed it was necessary for the Umkohonto to be trained in 
guerilla tactics that may come handy when the need arises to battle apartheid.  Training 
continued for the next two decades, but was spotty and could not be sustained, as the 
USSR could not get the ANC supplies needed to stand up to militarily to the apartheid 
regime. It was also difficult to smuggle the fighters back into South Africa.122  
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 The involvement of the USSR in South Africa became further complicated by 
the incursion and entanglement of Cuba with sub-Saharan Africa, proving the theory 
further that communism was not always of one accord in the Cold War years. With 
Cuba seeing the region as "‘imperialism's weakest link.'"123  Cuba had interests in the 
new post-colonialism governments as colonialism collapsed, thus raising the questions 
of Cuban influence in South Africa and to what extent.    
Piero Gleijeses, an historian and a professor of United States foreign policy who 
worked on Cuban foreign policy offered answers to this. While much of his work 
focused on Algeria, the Congo, and Angola, he did spend some time examining South 
Africa. It was Cuba's interest to spread its revolution through Africa that was far more 
concerning to the U.S. government than Soviet intentions.124   
 There was indeed an intention to ignite a leftist revolution, but this happened 
through Cuba, instead of the Soviet Union, in Angola, the Congo, and other former 
Belgian and Portuguese colonies and not in South Africa. South Africa was indeed 
never a high priority for the Soviets as the major leaders of the ANC in Tambo and 
Nelson Mandela- were not deemed communists and were never communists, so were 
never seriously wooed by the Soviets.125 A more significant parley was that of the U.S. 
and Great Britain with the South African regime as a result of their proposed investment 
in mineral resources and open trade.     
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The region was an important part of the ‘international civil war' of the twentieth 
century, as the war between ‘centre-right and left' interfered with the politics and armed 
battle in the Southern African region, against the theory of freedom and talks in favor of 
evolutionary, a socioeconomic change was effectively sidelined.126 
South African politics of the Cold War era cannot be simply defined by placing 
it as a traditional definition of the Cold War. Similarly misguided was enveloping 
apartheid's exploits and making it look like it was all because of its interests in taking 
sides with the US in the Cold War. Looking closely at it, one realizes that the Cold War 
paradigm was a myth, a facade.  This does not mean that Botha and Malan-the chief 
advocates and champions did not seriously believe in its fight in the Cold War and that 
they were fighting the West's good fight.  They really did. However, as enmeshed as 
they were in the misconception, it blinded them from the realities of the South African 
struggle and the denial of human rights of the Colored citizens of the country.  For the 
apartheid regime, communism was never really the issue.127  
In conclusion, The United States of America was able to exert its influence in 
South Africa, and further its economic course and win the battle of both ideological and 
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moral bragging rights on the Soviets. Even as the white minority leadership of South 
Africa was able to inflict more inhuman treatment on its non-white citizens in a bid to 
preserve its supremacy, while courting the favor of the US with its 'commitment' to 
stemming the advancement of communism in Southern Africa, with Washington 
looking the other way as its ego was continually stroked by the regime. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
HARBINGER OF CHANGE: PRESIDENT CARTER LATE 1970’S 
Of all the past administrations, it was President Jimmy Carter's administration 
that confronted apartheid South Africa the most. With the Kissinger initiative of 1976, 
the new government of the U.S. zoomed on Southern Africa, making the region a 
priority in the continent. The Carter administration committed resources to the area to 
sustain its interest there. With a wind of change, the U.S. verbally condemned the 
Apartheid policies, warned the Republic severely, and for a change, did not just talk, but 
acted in line with its voice, and conformed with mandatory U.N. arms ban. However, 
this new policy yielded little or nothing as the objective of annihilating Apartheid failed 
woefully as apartheid South Africa refused to budge and effect sweeping changes.128 
Writing about the presidential election that brought Jimmy Carter to the White 
House in 1976, reporter Kandy Stroud, claimed that "not many felt like lauding 
America this year…" and that "there was not that much to celebrate."129 It was a time 
when folks were dissatisfied pervasive with politics, and a predominant sense of 
disillusionment among the citizens of the United States as a result of both the nation's 
long engagement in the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal.130 Just because of the 
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then-Democratic candidate's campaign on a political premise that promised to further 
the regard for fundamental human rights, he seemed to be the kind of man that appealed 
to the United States citizenry and was a candidate that they felt could get elected. As 
soon as he was elected, the new president promised to "make America proud 
again,"131Many neutral observers believed his vision for respect for human rights would 
have a significant influence on formulating the American foreign policy. Carter's repute 
as a defender of human rights was further complemented and consolidated by a lot of 
appointments made which gave him rave reviews internationally and of course 
domestically. The strategic appointments made included Andrew Young, a human 
rights activist who was appointed as the United States ambassador to the United 
Nations. Another was the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who canvassed for the fair 
treatment of the poor before he was recognized and got the appointment. Lastly was 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who became the National Security Adviser.132 These highly 
influential officials were characterized by their ambition to minimize the grandness of 
the Cold War in their means to comprehending the dispute in Southern Africa and the 
rest of the world133 Furthermore, President Jimmy Carter's unique direction toward 
human rights was established with a Presidential Directive (NSC-30) of February 17, 
1978. This unique policy made it known to the world that "it shall be a primary 
objective of US foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout 
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the world." President Jimmy Carter highlighted the groundwork of what he called "the 
U.S. fundamental human rights policy" and explained the instances and conditions 
involving the violations of human rights and thus required American intervention. 
These instances comprised how successive governments abused power in illegal arrests, 
torture, degrading treatments and long detention of individuals without trial134. In such 
instances, the Democratic president promised that the United States would intervene 
and leverage its influence to preserve individual freedom worldwide135.  
Going by rhetoric, Jimmy Carter's government's foreign policy looked to adopt a 
completely new focus, and significant changes in rhetoric seemed to be introduced with 
the dominant discourse being used. In his first address in 1977, President Carter referred 
to human rights several times. He expressed the belief that United States foreign policy 
should drastically alter its priorities towards a nobler "fight against poverty, ignorance, 
and injustice.136” He also affirmed that the United States' foreign policy would 
significantly prefer to deal with societies which have respect for fundamental human 
rights.137 After being president for four months, Carter declared to the distinguished 
guests at the University of Notre Dame of his "reaffirmation of America's dedication to 
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fundamental human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy"138 In his 
inaugural Senate testimonial on foreign aid, Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State's 
rhetorics resonated with that of his president, offering the same commitment to 
upholding human rights. Vance pinpointed two cogent objectives of what should be the 
United States function abroad. His presentation again consists of conditions and words 
just as those used by President Carter. He elaborated that the United States' interference 
in the affairs of the world was supposed "to show America's compassion for the poor 
and dispossessed around the world," and "to contribute to the cause of peace."139 On 
another instance, Vance proudly declared that "the defense of human rights has been 
and will always be one of the main aims of this government's foreign policy." What was 
recurrent in the lexis of different protagonists in the Carter government was that the 
custom pointing to considerations for geopolitical and national interests were majorly 
muted, a fact largely illustrated by President Jimmy Carter's argument that "we are now 
free of that inordinate fear of communism."140 President Jimmy Carter's direction was to 
place great concentration on the United States' function and moral duty to fight to 
uphold fundamental human rights domestically and internationally. 
The Carter's administration's dedication to defending fundamental human rights 
was strong rhetorically. "Freedom", "liberation," and "human rights" are words 
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repeatedly echoed in President Carter's speeches.141 Through President Carter's 
speeches and public talks, he came out as not just a staunch human rights activist, but 
more importantly, his rhetoric displayed an obvious consistency in this commitment 
throughout his presidency. Upon his nomination as the 39th president of America in 
July 1976, Carter enthused: "our nation was the first to commit itself explicitly to basic 
moral and philosophical principles, a new, unique development that inspires mankind's 
imagination."   
At the 1977 Notre Dame event almost a year later, his appeal to the same 
principles looked unchanged when he announced that "as we know that democracy 
works, we can denounce the contentions of those leaders who deny their people human 
rights." This dedication to democracy and human rights, especially in Southern Africa, 
did not seem to become stained at the closure of his presidency because in his farewell 
speech, he prayed the new Republican presidency to stress human rights heavily like he 
did because "America every time must defend these basic human rights"142In 
considering American relations with Africa before the Jimmy Carter presidency, "the 
United States policy toward Africa in the 1950's and 1960's was that of the genial 
negligence of black Africa and cautious support of South Africa's white apartheid 
regime."143 President Carter's opinions about equality in racial matters, however, were 
on show as early as his 1971 inaugural speech as the governor of Georgia. In that 
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address, he declared that "After this long campaign, I say to you seriously that the time 
for racial injustice is done…no poor, weak, rural or black should have to bear the 
additional yoke of suffering deprivation of the chance of education, simple justice, or 
even a job."144 What makes this statement and others by Carter necessary is the kind of 
expectations and inspiration it gives and raised. As a matter of fact, after Carter's victory 
at the polls, anti-apartheid activists and elements retained hope that an entirely new 
approach to United States-Pretoria relations was to be addressed. This hope was helped 
as a result of the president's expression of regret during his campaign that he did not in 
any way help the domestic civil rights campaign in the U.S, and promised that if he 
becomes president, he will correct the anomaly.145 In fact, not long after being sworn in, 
Jimmy Carter traveled to Africa, becoming the first U.S. president to visit the continent. 
When he was there, he declared his oral dedication to democracy again and to uphold 
moral sanity. In an address in Lagos, Nigeria, he outlined his administration's policy to 
Africa and proudly declared to the Lagos audience that "with you, we share a dedication 
to majority rule and fundamental human rights…this dedication determines our position 
toward your continent."146   
The oration of elements in President Jimmy Carter's government regarding 
racism, as described above, promised a considerable deviation from the policies of 
previous United States anti-apartheid policies. The Carter presidency seemed to be 
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greatly aversed to any racism of any dimensions which thus extended toward apartheid, 
South Africa. Cyrus Vance reinforced this, as he delivered a speech highlighting the 
United States' policy Pretoria, in early July 1977.  
In the speech before the yearly conference of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), he notified the South African 
administration that its ties to the United States would significantly be affected if no 
substantial endeavor was soon made to change the racist apartheid policy. The aim of 
such reversal was to let the complete and efficient participation of all citizens of South 
Africa in politics, not minding the color of their skin. Cyrus Vance continued by 
expressing his opinion that it was important for apartheid Pretoria to start negotiating 
with the majority blacks in the country. He further warned the white minority that 
failure on their part to effect the desired changes would make their relationship 
deteriorate; stating that Washington DC will not support a system based on racial 
discrimination and remain true to ourselves"147 Andrew Young was also very vocal 
against the apartheid government. He was able to affirm the predominant assumption 
that this systemized favoritism toward the racist white was just not acceptable. He once 
announced that "at some junction, we've to reach the verdict that we ain't going to 
bankroll the apartheid regime. When we reach that conclusion, it's surprising how fast 
the people of South Africa will come to see the right thing to do."148 Carter believed that 
encouraging democracy and sustaining respect for human rights were not different from 
each other. He explained further that it would have been really useless to highlight 
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human rights abuse occurring in a precise context without considering the political 
system in which they occurred.149 It is thus only reasonable to conclude that President 
Carter ought to understand that the solution to the problem of blacks in South Africa 
was to try and pressure the apartheid regime, to impose a system that internationally 
abhors apartheid and to effect these changes, and institute a more auspicious means for 
majority rule and democracy. What is obvious is that, in theory, comparing the Ford and 
particularly the Nixon presidencies, which provided ephemeral and reckless attention to 
the challenge of racism in Pretoria, positive development in the means used by the U.S. 
as regards the nation looked to be on the horizon. The early signs were that the 
proponents of human rights and racial equality in top positions in the Carter 
administration were appointed, that the review of the African foreign policy was carried 
out just after he became the president, and the rhetoric and statements by Carter himself 
and top members of his administration.150 
Although it strongly disagreed with the tactics employed by the U.S. anti-
apartheid movement, the Carter administration concurred that the time had come for the 
United States to confront Pretoria. The new administration benefited from some 
individuals within the higher echelons of the State Department with prior knowledge 
and interest in South Africa. Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning, for example, 
had written his Ph.D. thesis addressing U.S. foreign policy toward the region, while 
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Donald McHenry, deputy representative to the U.N., had published a book on U.S. 
corporations in the Republic.151 There was a renewed commitment to Africa from the 
Carter administration. The chief executive himself was to be the first U.S. president to 
make an official visit to an independent African state when he traveled to Nigeria in the 
spring of 1978.152 He followed this trip by declaring, in June of that year, that we want a 
continent that is bereft of the control of external powers, rid of the acrimony of racist 
unfairness, without conflict, and without the yoke of hunger, disease, and poverty. We 
are certain that our best bet in achieving these objectives is through positive policies 
that recognize African realities and that recognize aspirations."153 One of Carter’s first 
acts had been to direct his vice president, Walter Mondale, to concentrate on African 
issues.154 Likewise, the president's choice of ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew 
Young, proved to be significant. With Young as the ambassador, there came about a 
direct bond between the Pretoria and the U.S.' own struggle against racial 
discrimination. Young's experience in the civil rights movement, his association with 
Martin Luther King, and his simple, non-confrontational style of statecraft helped 
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improve the relations between the United States and African governments.155 Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance, too, paid substantial attention to the issues of southern Africa.156  
 Indeed, if Carter’s initial foreign policies review process can be used as a 
measure, southern Africa was rated by the new administration as its fourth most 
pressing global concern, and it was the first region to be subject to a formal presidential 
directive.157 Presidential Directives set the tone for the new U.S. policy toward 
apartheid. Overall, the aim was to "promote the progressive transformation of South 
African society," and two parallel strategies were to be explored. First, the president 
directed Vance, in consultation with Young, to draw up a paper recommending "specific 
steps" that the United States should employ against the Republic. He asked that this 
paper also comments on the order of implementation of these actions. The second 
policy path involved Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, developing links 
with the 12 U.S. corporations that had recently signed the Sullivan Principles on fair 
employment practices for South Africa. Blumenthal was directed to encourage an 
expansion of this program.158 
This early presidential directive suggested that the Carter administration was 
preparing to abandon the "carrots" associated with National Security Study 
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Memorandum 39, for "sticks": punitive sanctions included.159 Confrontation, beyond 
just rhetoric, was now on the agenda. The administration was not, however, 
contemplating a complete break with Pretoria. Any punitive measures implemented 
would be designed to be consummate with events in the Republic, and the South 
African government's responsiveness to the administration. An effective "ratcheting up" 
of pressure was the aim. The second element of the directive underlined this point of 
measured confrontation. Carter indicated that he was reluctant to impose any kind of 
economic embargo on the Republic. For the time being, the administration considered 
that an engaged U.S. corporate community in South Africa could act as a force for 
change. Officials would seek to tap into this potential influence by working with the 
Sullivan signatories. Overall, it was hoped this binary approach would "offer a credible 
alternative to armed struggle," and limit the opportunities for Soviet intervention in 
southern Africa.160 To intimate its new policy to the South African government, the 
administration agreed to a summit. Prime Minister B.J. Vorster had suggested the need 
for such a meeting in a personal letter sent to Carter during March 1977. Vorster had 
asked, "Why must we confront one another, why must we quarrel with each other? Can 
we not resolve our differences in a way?" He recommended that further talks should 
take place through a personal envoy, as he considered "normal channels of 
communication" to be "inappropriate."161 President Carter, despite Vorster’s swipe at 
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the State Department, concurred. He thought that it “could be mutually profitable to 
have a full and candid exchange of views concerning Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and 
the future political evolution of South Africa.”162 A bilateral summit was accordingly 
arranged. The protocol behind this meeting was intricate. The United States did not 
wish to be seen talking to South Africa under the full gaze of the international press 
unless there was to be a guaranteed degree of cooperation. Diplomatic feelers were 
therefore deployed to help Washington DC determine the rank of the envoy selected 
and the venue for this summit. In the end, Vice President Mondale was dispatched. The 
president felt confident enough with Pretoria's continued engagement vis-à-vis the 
Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations to permit this. Communication before the 
meeting, however, indicated that South Africa was unlikely to offer any significant 
concessions over apartheid itself.  
Consequently, the South African territory was considered inappropriate for the 
talks.163 A neutral venue in Vienna was agreed instead, with representatives meeting 
over two days, commencing on 19 May 1977. The message that Washington DC wished 
to communicate to Vorster was that U.S.-South African relations had now reached a 
watershed. In particular, Pretoria was given notice that the United States considered the 
three issues of Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid to now be “delinked.” Vorster would 
no longer be offered a “free ride” on apartheid, in return for cooperation elsewhere in 
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the region.164 As Donald McHenry later told the Council on Religion and International 
Affairs, "We cannot, on one side, try to  resolve the problems in Namibia and Rhodesia, 
and at the same time mute our voices on the outrageous situation in Soweto."165 The 
United States was now demanding simultaneous results. As the vice president put it: 
“We don’t think progress on one issue excuses no progress on another.”166 Regarding 
defining exactly what this "progress" should be, Mondale was careful not to proscribe 
any specific action.167 Prior to Vienna, the  administration’s internal policy review had 
concluded that U.S. pressure should seek “A peaceful and progressive transformation of 
South African society, involving the  elimination of institutionalized racism and leading 
to rule by the majority of all the governed, with full and equal political participation by 
all and guaranteed rights for minorities.”168 Detailed public demands, however, were not 
specified. Instead, the administration, throughout its term of office, only talked about 
"full political participation" as being the requirement.169 A particular blueprint for 
change was thus avoided, and no one model of post-apartheid governance favored. As 
Mondale stated at the conclusion of the Vienna talks: "If there is progress within South 
Africa to remove laws such as the pass laws, discrimination laws, these job set-aside 
laws, laws to permit active political expression without intimidation, those things 
should be encouraged and appreciated." Ultimately, however, Mondale thought it was 
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up to South Africans themselves to determine their future.170 The Carter administration 
acknowledged that what it demanded of Pretoria would “profoundly change the nature” 
of U.S.-South African relations.171 This was not so much because Washington DC had 
delinked the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid, but because the United 
States was now prepared to issue an ultimatum to achieve its ends. Vice President 
Mondale made it known at Vienna that in the absence of positive moves from the 
Republic, in all three of these areas, the United States would "change its position of 
opposing mandatory sanctions."172 This was a threat that the Carter administration 
repeated throughout its watch. Secretary of State Vance, for instance, warned Pretoria 
just two months after Vienna that, "If progress is not recorded in ten days, our relations 
will inevitably suffer"; a year later he told the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, 
"We have to make it clear that a deterioration of our bilateral relations is inevitable if 
progress is not made"; in 1979, William Dunfey, a member of Carter's U.N. delegation, 
informed the General Assembly that if reform from Pretoria was not forthcoming his 
government "will consider other ways to bring about change"; and even in 1980, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose was  talking about "our 
relations with the South Africa Government" being "dependent upon progress toward 
the elimination of apartheid."173 The message was clear from Vienna onward: Pretoria 
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only had limited time in which to comply with international standards of racial 
relations. If there was not suitable progress within this (never specified) time frame, the 
United States was prepared to apply punitive sanctions. South Africa’s response to the 
Vienna démarche was mixed. Once again, Pretoria reiterated that it was fully prepared 
to cooperate with Washington DC over the Rhodesia and Namibia negotiations. Within 
bounds, the Republic was willing to exert pressure on Prime Minister Ian Smith vis-à-
vis Rhodesia. Likewise, Vorster confirmed that Pretoria was prepared to end its 
occupation of Namibia, subject to details being confirmed and guarantees being 
made.174  
Under Jimmy Carter's Administration (1977-1981), the United States endorsed a 
tougher stance against the South African government, seeing African nationalism as a 
driving force in the region that was compatible with United States interests.175However, 
Carter believed that the United States should expand business activities in South Africa 
because business would be a force for "change."176 In 1977, President Carter had cut the 
representation of military American Defense Attaché Officers in South Africa in protest 
against the South African crack down in the wake of the infamous uprisings in Soweto 
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in 1976.177  Also, the Carter Administration banned the export of all items to the South 
African military and police and prohibited the export of computers that would be used 
to enforce apartheid.178    
Furthermore, during Carter's tenure as president, it witnessed the United Nations 
adopting the UN Security Council Resolution 418. On November 4, 1977, the 
resolution was endorsed, imposing a compulsory arms ban against the administration of 
South Africa. To President Carter's credit, he forcefully and adamantly opposed the 
institution of apartheid in South Africa and called for its immediate end.  However, in 
spite of Carter's harder stance toward South Africa, the hardest, compared with other 
presidents, it was Ronald Reagan's presidency (1981-1989) that would change the 
course of the relationship between the United States with South Africa.179 
Jimmy Carter became president of the United States of America in 1977 with 
the intent of emphasizing the defense of human rights as an important feature of its 
foreign policy. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley comment that "Carter felt 
the issue deeply himself and also, it provided an opportunity for him to distinguish his 
foreign policy from that of Nixon and Kissinger."180 One might expect such an 
emphasis to result in rather intense pressure from the United States on the South African 
regime to dismantle its apartheid system, and such an impression would have been 
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reinforced by Carter's appointment of African American activist Andrew Young as the 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.  
And, indeed in its early days, the Carter administration did take some steps to 
increase the pressure for reform on the South African regime, strengthening, for 
example, an embargo on arms to that nation. In 1978, it also "reprimanded South 
African for a possible explosion of a nuclear device."181 In the end, Carter 
administration refused to take any actions that would differentiate its policy toward 
South Africa substantially from that of its Republican predecessors. According to the 
Digital National Security Archive (2004), "like its predecessor, the Carter 
Administration...actively discouraged revolutionary change in South Africa and 
advocated moderate reforms."182  
And if the Carter administration was reluctant, because of Cold War pressures, 
to push the South African regime too hard for a change in its policy of apartheid, the 
Reagan administration was even more likely to give priority to its struggle against the 
Soviet Union over any effort to bring about rapid political reform in South 
Africa.183Furthermore, Carter’s campaign rhetoric about the importance of human rights 
led many, especially liberals, to believe that he was implicitly promising to take a 
tougher, more principled stand against the white minority governments in Pretoria and 
Salisbury. American grassroots organizations were optimistic; black African countries 
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were hopeful.184 Consequently, in the struggle to end Apartheid in South Africa 
President Jimmy Carter is best remembered for talking tough about human rights and 
apartheid yet acted soft in effecting change to the status quo. He let slip the opportunity 
to follow his oration with action by placing economic gains over the emancipation of 
the maligned Southern Africans.  In the next chapter, we will see if the next American 
presidencies took the chance that President Carter let slip. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DIVESTMENT: US POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN 
The Reagan presidency also had to deal with the conundrum that was the 
Apartheid regime of South Africa. The country's precious minerals, its prime strategic 
location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of American and the West's policy 
of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the several excuses cited by 
previous United States presidencies for encouraging the National Party of South Africa 
and its policies in Pretoria. This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise 
two years after Reagan left office.185 It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support 
Pretoria was in the interest of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for 
the indignity, pains, and sufferings experienced by the sheer vast numbers of the South 
African citizenry meted out by the apartheid regime, the U.S. government continuously 
appealed the U.N. and the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.186 
A New Dawn 
  A new dawn in the policy of the United States toward South Africa was ushered 
in in November 1980 with the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. The "new 
right," looking to change the liberal policies of the previous administrations in foreign 
policy, moved into power.  Furthermore, Reagan's election to the U.S. presidency would 
herald the beginning of a fundamentally new political order. Reagan's victory, therefore, 
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constituted no less than a "revolution."  President Reagan played a major role in shaping 
the administration's policy towards the Southern African nation.    
President Ronald Reagan being a typical politician, deviated completely from 
the Carter ideology of human rights protection oration, believing that the U.S. had to 
oppose communism and protect its strategic interest in the region.187  Under the Ronald 
Reagan government, Pretoria had eventually found in the U.S, an administration ready 
to take arguments about its strategic and political importance as an anti-Communist ally 
seriously.188 
         The new government was supportive of the white minority government in 
Pretoria, and Southern Africa as a whole. The South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister at 
that time, P.W. Botha and other members of the South African government would visit 
the U.S. early in Reagan's first term as president to meet with high-ranking cabinet 
officials.  During this time, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester 
Crocker, a veteran from the Nixon administration, would craft Reagan's policy towards 
South Africa, Constructive Engagement. 
A New Policy 
         Describing the terms of the tenets of the policy tagged, Constructive Engagement, 
which follows a systematic, gradual reform in Pretoria. "The diplomatic relations 
between Pretoria and the U.S. has now reached a crossroads of arguably historic import.  
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After two decades of generally increasing official U.S. government indifference to 
South Africa and related Pretorian inflexibility, the possibility may now arise for a 
much more positive and mutual relations between the two nations based upon shared 
strategic concerns in Southern Africa, our recognition that the government of P.W. 
Botha constitutes a unique opportunity for domestic change, and willingness of the 
Reagan Administration to deal realistically with South Africa."189 
Dr. Chester Crocker was appointed Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs soon after Reagan's success at the polls in 1981.  By 1988, at the end of his 
tenure, Crocker had become the longest-serving Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs since the department's creation in 1958.190   
        Crocker was then both an Associate Professor of International Relations at the 
Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the Director of African Studies at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies at the same university before the U.S. 
Department of State.  During this time, he wrote "South Africa: Strategy for Change" a 
document which highlights his favorite policy of "Constructive Engagement" to the 
Southern African administrations – particularly Pretoria.191 The Assistant Secretary of 
State wondered, after 20 years of different party presidencies, if the United States even 
had a working policy toward Pretoria. "South Africa: Strategy for Change" would 
become the blueprint for President Reagan's diplomatic policy of Constructive 
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Engagement toward Pretoria and the Southern African region in general.  The case for 
pursuing activist tactics of regional engagement relied less on the opportunities for 
success than on the real costs of not trying at all.192 "Clearly, the fundamental 
objective," was the coming to fore of a Pretorian nation "with which the U.S. can pursue 
its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constant embarrassment or 
political damage.193" However, the ideas of the administration were viewed by some 
observers as a conceptual throwback to the previous twenty years, when Henry 
Kissinger, pursued "communication" as a policy toward the Apartheid administration, 
emphasizing mutual tactical and economic interests, during the Nixon administration.194 
To not focus only on the objective of a full-blown national convention was the 
way forward as shown in Pretoria’s sovereignty showing that only the regime itself can 
control and monitor the particular exercise since the West has all to gain if it breaks 
through in pressing minority white-led change toward the direction of real power-
brokering.195 At the base of this faith was that only the white minority of Pretoria could 
effect peaceful change, and that the majority blacks canvassing for the demise of 
apartheid must achieve this in a peaceful and nonviolent manner.  Constructive 
Engagement's focus would focus aim at a process of change and would avoid focusing 
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on the outcome of destroying Apartheid, as this would keep the West (particularly the 
U.S.) immobilized by a distant objective.196 Washington would need a nimble and 
sustained diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders.197 
      Even before Crocker joined the Reagan presidency, he was a vocal critic of the 
policy of Carter toward Pretoria. Crocker stated that"the Carter government enveloped 
itself in a straight-jacket of policies which steers and welcomes comparisons of its 
promises and performance."198  Helping the decision to appoint Crocker to work on ties 
with Pretoria was the fact that he took exception to the previous administration's harsh 
opinions, its extremist and supposedly unrealistic requests to relinquish power, and its 
many attempts, often half-hearted, to disassociate itself from the regime in Pretoria.199  
        Making up for what he regarded as immoderate vocal rivalry toward South Africa 
by the Carter presidency, Crocker tried to relate with South Africa's tactical interests, 
particularly its anti-communism position, and to sympathize with the fear of the white 
minority.  Emphasizing plea over pressure, he signaled in advance that there would be 
no significant penalties for inability to cooperate.200  "In South Africa, it is not our job 
to have a choice between black and white. In this land of abundance, talented and 
different people, essential Western strategic, economic, moral and political concerns are 
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at stake.201 For South Africa to obey the global demands for eliminating Apartheid, 
Crocker declared that the U.N, and especially the U.S., must engage with the 
government of South Africa. There was an opportunity to help shape a regional climate 
conducive to political accommodation in both Southern Africa and Pretoria if Western 
administrations were ready to engage in "maintained and active diplomacy" involving 
leadership in regional problem-solving.202    
The questions ‘how could the United States actively support Pretoria to be able 
to decide their future without the baggage of apartheid that takes into account the 
interests of the United States were inherent. He proffered a logical reaction to those who 
trust that wielding an imposing United States influence would be a disadvantage to the 
whole objective that was being worked at. Then new experience with Iran at that point 
in time should mute those who believed the United States should wield strong might in 
socially, economically, and politically weakening apartheid Pretoria. The abolishing of 
apartheid creating a fresh non-racial administration was not going to be actualized by an 
unannounced dramatic act such as banning trade or investment with South Africa or 
even comprehensive sanctions backed by military power. 
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Pretoria had proved they could endure all those challenges from former U.S. 
governments.  A major reason used by the Reagan government for the loss of U.S. 
impact was that past bans led to the loss of credibility with the South African 
government.203  
Reagan in Bed with Apartheid 
Constructive engagement, as highlighted by an executive order by President 
Reagan, rested on the assumptions underlying the ideal outcomes.  First, South Africa's 
all-encompassing military and commercial dominance in the region of Southern Africa 
and its great internal security system would, shortly, allow South Africa to "control" 
external pressures and internal ones to achieve change. Second, the Botha 
administration could be stimulated to agree to a globally embraced settlement in 
Namibia if Pretorian withdrawal were linked to a removal of Cuban artillery from 
Angola and the possibility of an advancement in Pretoria- U.S. relations.  A settlement 
in early Namibia would set a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in South 
Africa and the region in motion, thus corroborating the unique approach; so, progress 
could be recorded more swiftly on apartheid issues if the U.S. government used official 
rather than public channels for its criticism and pressure.204 "We can work with a nation 
going through a rehabilitative change," Crocker controversially wrote in a Scope Paper 
for Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State at this point that a new American mentality 
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must evolve.205 The United States and the international community could no longer 
force a change in the diplomatic politics of Pretoria. Rather, the regime would need to 
realize that her racism was destroying its credibility.  
However, there was proof in the regime that change was coming with the 
National Party under the control of P.W. Botha. With Western engagement absent in 
South Africa, and the region as a whole, it would be impossible to provide assurances 
that South Africa would be allowed to have a future with no apartheid. Furthermore, the 
Americans believed that it should strongly encourage a regional circumstance receptive 
to compromise and to accommodate before concerted attempts to not validate 
innovative change and to capitalize on the inevitable unclear and periodic "happenings" 
that will bring about diplomatic liberalization.206 
Change Becomes Imminent 
At that time in South Africa, the blacks got some privileges and rights, although 
not much. They were able to get employed in jobs that had been refused them in the 
past. The regime removed all the legal sanctions installed to block blacks from being on 
some international Sports teams of the Southern African country.  The most important 
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change occurred in the labor sector. Blacks had finally been given trade union rights 
and were steadily moving up into more skilled employment.207   
Perhaps more necessary, the finance of Pretoria was not flailing when Reagan 
assumed office. South Africa was doing fine. South Africa's economy was flush from 
the exorbitant sums got from gold and other mineral exports.208  The general thought 
amongst those in the Reagan Administration was that the previous administration's 
strategy of broken relations with Pretoria was not yielding much difference within the 
South African National Party.  Early in Reagan's presidency, he toned down on some of 
the bans that had been placed on Pretoria. 
With the United States' concerns in South Africa, the supposed incoherence, 
non-efficient policies from previous governments, and the unclear change emanating 
from inside the racist regime, what strategy should the Reagan presidency employ on 
the ruling National Party?  The question the government had to answer was this 
particular one. The U.S. could best enhance change in the apartheid regime by dealing 
with the minority white might structure and being conscious of white fears.209 He said, 
"Our objective, is to increase the confidence of the Pretorian administration. As the 
convener of the Constructive Engagement policy, Assistant Secretary Crocker wanted 
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to make a centrist general agreement, some synthesis of Carter’s activism and human 
rights concerns, with NSSM‟s realist approach.210  He would seek to make his approach 
to constructive engagement toward South Africa an acknowledgment of the country's 
importance to the United States and the West.    
Even before Crocker was appointed an Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, he made it abundantly clear that he did not see that the policy of isolating South 
Africa or exerting unnecessary pressure on it was particularly sensible. He stated that 
"the United States do not want to 'unruffle' Pretoria or undermine our own tactical and 
economic concerns. The might force of South Africa is not in our hands."211  To also 
establish these proclamations, Crocker would publicly express them, to further appease 
Pretoria. The policy eventually padded the soothing of South Africa. This, of course, 
was a welcomed view for Pretoria. In the days of the Carter presidency, they have 
believed the Carter’s 'robust' approach to their administration as a hindrance to 
extending the relations with the United States. One of the first acts of constructive 
engagement was to repeal Carter's 1978 complete prohibition of United States trade 
between herself and the South African military and police. Starting in mid-1981, the 
companies in the United States could do business in Pretoria as a result of the 
Constructive Engagement policy.   
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They could now trade in basic commodities like food, clothing, nonstrategic 
chemicals, calculators, personal computers, and copying machines.212  The government 
explained that although other parts of the arms ban remain, making sure of "a strong 
emblematic and diplomatic disassociation of the United States from the enforcement of 
apartheid," Carter's complete embargo was merely "futile" and had "zero effect."213  
Though, compliance with the U.N. arms ban and the United States' failure to utilize 
Pretorian defense materials were symbolic of importance to the policy and should be 
furthered when there is no major diplomatic change, barring a dramatic deterioration in 
the geopolitical situation facing the West in adjacent areas.214  Those areas that change 
frequently lead to should be made possible and given priority. He further elaborated that 
the United States should prevent, the snare of a sweeping assault on every part of 
Apartheid – as if each was as odious and neither should be taken into consideration first. 
If there were a shift in that policy, it would be for a prolonged and orderly change.  The 
U.S. would surely, in this sense, mix itself up with particular processes, change agents, 
and political forces in concrete cases.215 The administration's new policy was a new 
dawn to the ties between South Africa and the United States. It was "not the clandestine 
embrace" of the Nixon administration nor "polecat treatment" of the Carter years.216 
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Reagan Strongly Denies Supporting Apartheid 
The victory of President Reagan had bestowed the U.S. with a fresh level of 
trust with Pretoria because "our desire and mandate is to see changes in diplomatic 
relations." Though the policy of Constructive Engagement decided to not confront with 
the regime in Pretoria, the Reagan presidency did not but express its opposition to 
Apartheid.217  Contrary to popular anti-apartheid belief, the policy of Constructive 
Engagement was a positive approach to promoting change in Pretoria. Terming 
Apartheid as "morally unacceptable," the government was stubbornly in opposition to 
Apartheid.  One time, in a Congressional hearing in regards to the United States stance 
toward Pretoria, Assistant Secretary Crocker posited that "our strong political and moral 
belief about a policy based on legalized racism (any policy which gives or takes 
political rights on this racial premise) – with the legitimacy of citizenship itself – is 
going to be repulsive."218  Pretoria was using the only system globally "refusing its 
countrymen natural rights which are openly and legally based on racism," a fact which 
bestowed upon apartheid "special distinction as the world's most condemned system."219  
Notwithstanding their dislike for Apartheid, the fact remains the strategy of 
constructive engagement was aimed at appeasing Pretoria.  Washington, D.C. wanted 
the government of South Africa to know that the U.S. could "cooperate with a society 
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undergoing constructive change."220  The administration believed that it was in 
America's interest to encourage and assist reforms and to accept that without the 
reforms, the threat to American concerns would inevitably gather speed.221 However, as 
admitted by the Reagan administration, constructive engagement with South Africa had 
limits regarding achieving results. The U.S. Ambassador to Apartheid South Africa 
stated that: "we cannot impose any policy on any nation in the region, nor would we 
want to," in an address at the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, in 
1983.  
"At the core of U.S. serious experience in Pretoria is that we have realized that 
there is a critical boundary to what any other superpower – or the United States can do 
to effect change in the apartheid state.222 "Decision-making and political exploits would 
be regionally focused, while the option of whether to compete or not – when the Cubans 
and the communist Soviets were seriously taking advantage of and militarizing regional 
conflicts – would have worldwide implications." Constructive engagement tried to buy 
the government of South Africa space and time to reform its society.223  The 
administration believed that Apartheid transitioning through evolution would suffice 
and favorable to the U.S. so long as the ruling National Party's strategy represented 
                                                 
 
 
220 Thomson Alex, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994, 
118.   
221 Thomson Alex, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994:  
Conflict of Interests (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 118. 
222 J.E Davies, Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in 
South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8 (Johannesburg, James Currey, 2007), 24. 
223 Thomson Alex, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1948-1994:  
Conflict of Interests (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 114.   
91 
 
 
genuine reforms. The Assistant Secretary's views were summed up in a 1981 State 
Department memo: "Though we may still not agree on Apartheid and cannot allow a 
system of legalized racial discrimination, we can unite with a nation experiencing 
change."224 Moreover, while sympathetic towards white South African attitudes, 
Washington did not react to the plight of the majority blacks and was seen in that 
perspective by the blacks of Pretoria, a lot of whom had come to see the U.S. as a close 
friend of the Apartheid regime. As well as blessing a constitution that marginalized 
blacks, South Africa endorsed a new policy giving limited parliamentary inclusion to 
the Coloreds, and Indians but excluded the black majority. 
 Botha, the South African prime minister, had decided to make changes, reforms 
that were not much. His American counterpart saw a window of opportunity that 
Botha's reforms brought, and decided to relate with the Southern African nation, after 
several years of discrepant policies toward them from the United States. With the 
objective of snuffing out communism in the background, the administration worked on 
Constructive Engagement that would seduce the white minority of Pretoria, while 
sustaining the United States' concerns in the nation. It was proposed, that peaceful 
change preponderantly would be realized through white institutions in South Africa.  
"There is not a great reason to contest the near-term survivability of white power in 
South Africa," according to the Reagan administration Constructive Engagement gave 
Pretoria with material benefits from early in Reagan's first term at the White House.225 
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With the material incentives of increase in trade and exchange of technology between 
both countries, Pretoria became a friend of the U.S. Reagan hoped not to repeat 
previous administration's parley with South Africa devoid of a coherent policy.226 The 
elements of Constructive Engagement toughened South Africa up to make the status 
quo remain as it is, thus encouraging the apartheid regime to elongate apartheid. 
Nevertheless, the known objectives of the policy of Constructive Engagement, it 
eliminated any serious positives for Pretoria to launder its international image by 
improving the conditions of its majority black African population.227  
Desmond Tutu and Ronald Reagan 
          Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a fierce black South African activist, who clinched 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984, frustrated with the continued inactivity of the west and 
the backing of the racist government of South Africa to the detriment of the blacks, 
slammed the leaders of the US, Britain, and West Germany. Bishop Tutu did not mince 
words as he branded Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl as racists for supporting the racist 
apartheid government. ''I have tried to be as nice as I could be, but we're talking about 
children being killed by a racist government that is being protected from the 
consequences of its actions by Mr. Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Kohl,'' The Nobel 
Laurate posited in an interview, in obvious swipe at Prime Minister Thatcher and 
Chancellor Kohl of West Germany. Bishop Desmond Tutu continued by saying that 
                                                 
 
 
226 Shandrá D. Hipp, Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan’s Problematic Policy of 
Appeasement with South Africa (D.C, Georgetown University, March 23, 2012), 44. 
227 Freeman, Linda, and Alfred O. Hero. ""Constructively" Supporting Aggression and 
Repression - Reagan's South Africa Policy." Canadian Journal of African Studies / 
Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 18, no. 3 (1984): 627-33. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/484775. (accessed September 25, 2017). 
93 
 
 
"certainly, the support of this racist policy is racist."228  ''I'm supposed now as a Nobel 
laureate to speak responsibly and all that sort of thing, and I try to, but I just think we 
are seeing closet racism coming out into the open. How else can you explain the fact 
that people say that sanctions will hurt the blacks, so we won't apply sanctions?''229  
          In his address at the New York General Assembly's Special Committee Against 
Apartheid, he aired his frustrations at the total lack of sympathy at the suffering of 
blacks in his country by the Reagan government. He continued by saying, ''It is highly 
unlikely he would have the same indifference if the casualties had been white,'' 
obviously referring to the 700 mostly black people, who have been killed in racial 
hostilities in South Africa since August of the previous year.230 He continued by saying 
that if the South African government failed to end apartheid in the following six months 
he would call for sanctions in line with the Commonwealth agreement in the Bahamas 
to impose mild sanctions and follow up with tougher ones in six months.  
           In his criticism of the policy of Constructive Engagement, he said, ''I said when 
constructive engagement was put into place that it was unmitigated disaster for 
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blacks.''231 On the blacks' readiness for sanctions and President Ronald Reagan's speech 
on South Africa and Apartheid early 1985, he said, ''Trade unions, black trade unions 
have said they call for sanctions.'' ''Over 70 percent of our people in two surveys have 
shown that they want sanctions. He continues that Reagan thinks otherwise, by saying, 
“No, President Reagan knows better - we will suffer.''He sits there like the great, big 
white chief of old can tell us black people that we don't know what is good for us,'' he 
continued. ''The white man knows.''232  
            In a speech at Hunter College in New York in 1986, Bishop Desmond Tutu 
further denounced Ronald Reagan and his policy of constructive engagement by saying, 
"there is no room for neutrality. When you say you are neutral in a situation of injustice 
and oppression, you have decided to support the unjust status quo. Are you on the side 
of injustice? Are you on the side of oppression or liberation? Are you on the side of 
death or of life? Are you on the side of goodness or of evil?"233  
           The Nobel Prize winner vehemently protests that the quiet diplomacy by the 
government of Reagan towards Apartheid South Africa has made life turn for the worse 
for blacks in the country. The policy of constructive engagement has indeed increased 
racial violence meted out on the hapless blacks in the country, and the continued 
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alliance between Reagan and Pretoria does not bode well for the blacks and for the end 
of apartheid.234 
George Bush’s Different Approach 
In contrast to Ronald Reagan, George Bush comes to the South African issue 
vulnerable in a political sense. Note that Reagan entered his second term in 1984 on the 
heels of a landslide victory over Democratic challenger Walter Mondale. Bush won the 
presidency in the 1988 polls by a large popular and electoral majority vote, but it is 
serious to note– as the political experts in the administration bear in mind – that strains 
caused by the electoral college voting system masked what was actually a very close 
win by Bush over Democrat Michael Dukakis in 1988.235 
The thing is that in the states which could have ensured Governor Dukakis win the 
election, Bush came on top by a small percentage. Bush won over the conservatives, 
which is usually comfortable for a Republican gunning for the White House against a 
liberal. However, Bush's strategy for winning hinged upon his call to some liberals and 
even moderates, who got hooked to his message of a 'kinder, gentler nation. Bush must, 
however, formulate a policy dependent on his political desires for his re-election of 
1992. And with the elections fast approaching, the Bush administration was going to be 
very preoccupied with making policy in ways calculated to retain his support among 
moderates and some liberals. He may regard the issue of South Africa as a means of 
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assisting in achieving that aim, as a lot of general voters in America still favors stricter 
anti-apartheid measures.236 
Unlike Reagan, Bush comes to the South African issue indifferent to any policy. 
Bush did not request for, and neither received any mandate from voters on how to 
thread on the subject. In the course of his campaign, the candidate almost did not touch 
on the subject. However, Bush entered the fray with an address to suggest that the U.S. 
sanctions against the regime in South Africa was a positive one, as Pretoria now knew 
how serious the U.S. government was on displacing Apartheid. He said it would seem 
that the sanctions caused great hardship and economic stress for the blacks of South 
Africa. Bush refused to elucidate his statement on the discourse, only to show that he 
was not going to change or drum support for the repeal of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act(CAAA). The resulting effect of that is that President Bush regarding 
policy towards South Africa became neutral, without venturing towards any particular 
direction, but he was vulnerable to pressure from any side looking to take charge of the 
policy.237 
The Bush administration, however, with its continued opposition to sanctions, 
had a different strategy in mind. Herman Cohen’s interpretation of the CAAA surfaced 
during a July 1991 hearing of the House of Representatives. The assistant secretary of 
state argued that, when it was passed, the CAAA was not meant to reward Pretoria only 
when a non-racial democracy was established. Instead, this legislation was about 
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encouraging the National Party government to make initial steps toward negotiation. It 
was about persuading Pretoria to undertake the fundamental reforms that would permit 
constitutional talks. And this is exactly how the administration used the CAAA. Now 
that Pretoria had met the criteria, and continued to negotiate, the National Party was 
rewarded by a progressive removal of sanctions.238 In particular, this approach was 
designed to help President De Klerk ward off opposition from the “white right” within 
South Africa, enabling Pretoria to demonstrate tangible benefits of reform. Bush 
continued this strategy of reward as the negotiations evolved. In October 1991, for 
instance, the White House removed the U.S. embargo on the sale of computers, aircraft, 
and petroleum products to the South African military.239 Similarly, in February 1992, 
the president authorized the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank to once again offer loans 
and guarantees on South African contracts. At the same time, South Africa had 
reclassified a "friendly state" on the Foreign Assistance Act.240 Again, these measures 
were portrayed as helping to ease the negotiations process. Effectively, the sanctions 
debate was now closed in the United States. The Bush administration had removed 
those punitive measures that were under its control, whereas the incoming Clinton 
administration chose not to seek the removal of any of the remaining rules.   
The United States still banned nuclear transfers to the Republic; prohibited 
intelligence sharing; required fair employment practices from businesses seeking 
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Export-Import Bank  assistance; embargoed remaining gray area items being sold to the 
Republic's security forces; refused South African related tax credits; instructed its 
officials to advocate withholding International Monetary Fund Finance from countries 
practicing apartheid; maintained the U.N. mandatory arms embargo; and had in place a 
myriad of other state and local government imposed restrictions targeting purchasing 
contracts and investments involving businesses associated with the apartheid 
economy.241 Clinton’s position effectively ended any hopes that the anti-sanctions lobby 
had by way of continuing to chip away at this list of provisions. Clinton was not going 
to cede more grounds to Pretoria unless the republic was ready to be positive and 
forthcoming on the reforms. The new president took the view that he would only 
recommend the removal of these remaining sanctions when signaled to do so by the 
ANC. The U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Princeton N. Lyman, recalled how 
President de Klerk “visibly winced” when he was informed of this stance.242 
It must be noted, however, that it's not all gloom for President George Bush. 
Matter of fact, he had an advantage that Reagan of 1986 never had. For one, he can 
refer to a successful foreign policy in Southern Africa - that is, the Angola/Namibia 
agreement of 1988. During his campaign, candidate Bush defended against the calls for 
sanctions by citing this diplomatic accomplishment. The Economic sanctions at this 
volatile time, he argued, would jeopardize the accord and doom the opportunity for an 
autonomous Namibia. When Bush becomes president, he can expectedly utilize the 
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same argument - for the time - to block pressure from the embargo, from Capitol Hill.243 
Another factor in Bush's favor is that public awareness of and concern about the South 
African topic had since 1986, drastically reduced. This affords the president ample 
political space to evolve and market a unique policy that is not as drastic as the one 
supported by Congress recently.  
Lastly, Bush's tenure sees good relations with the Soviet Union being inherited 
and helped his course with the cogent relationship with the Soviets.244 This helped open 
fresh, new opportunities of combined superpower process against Pretoria. The republic 
could no longer use the excuse of communism to court the favor of the United States 
while in the process continuing with Apartheid, which was unimaginable in 1986, when 
President Ronald Reagan and Congress had a run in at each other. 
On the whole, this chapter highlights the obvious shifts from the toothless 
oratory of Jimmy Carter and his support for the fundamental human rights of the 
citizens of the world, to the pragmatism of President Ronald Reagan, who saw the need 
to vehemently combat communism and thus protect the United States' interest in 
Southern Africa. Reagan drafted the policy of Constructive Engagement, championed 
by Crocker, which became friendly towards the regime in South Africa, and made 
enemies with black South Africans. George Bush, on the other hand, came with a 
conspicuous neutrality, removing embargoes in the apartheid nation, especially as 
communism was no longer an issue to deal with.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE FALL OF APARTHEID 
The rise and fall of the South Africa’s system of racial oppression which is 
known as the apartheid system really marked one of the most infamous chapters in the 
contemporary world history. The consequences of apartheid on over 40 million South 
Africans who were present at the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first 
democratically elected president of South Africa in the year 1994 are indelible.245 The 
racist apartheid regime of South Africa came to fore in the year 1948, with the 
ascending to power of the Afrikaner-dominated National Party and its promotion of an 
ideology of racial and ethnic separatism. Apartheid officially came to an end in the year 
1994, the period when the African National Congress-dominated a majority of 
parliamentary seats in the first South African democratic election. However, it would be 
a misconception to view the existing legal structure of apartheid, or also its 
psychological and social effects, as starting abruptly and fully in 1948 or as ending 
suddenly with the change of regime in 1994. It was an earlier policy of the state, and it 
took the period of thirty years to establish.246 These policies includes the relocation of 
African families from their respective farms and placed them in a “native reserves”; the 
segregation of living, working, and recreational spaces available within the cities; the 
classification of Africans as a “temporary sojourners” within the cities; and also a range 
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of laws restricting the interaction between races, including the separation of the public 
services and amenities (“petty apartheid”).247 
           However, it was considered that the tendencies which ought to lead to the 
relinquishment of apartheid from the year 1990 onwards were already made evident in 
the late 1970s. During this period, of course, things were not too clear, and this 
development was said to be seen as signs of hope by the apartheid’s opponents, or, by 
its supporters, as major problems which must be confronted and overcome, if they were 
identified at all.248South Africa’s transformation took even the National Party by 
surprise, as did many South Africans. “It was a cautious change as not all were 
enthusiastic or optimistic about changes, in South Africa. The relatively passive stance 
taken by the National government was a result of the priority that domestic affairs took 
in the years 1990-1994, and an international situation that did not allow for acts that 
could be interpreted as support for the increasingly shaky Nationalist government in 
Pretoria.”249 
  The period 1990-1994 was probably the most complex and challenging period 
from a South African standpoint. Following the forced resignation of P.W. Botha in 
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1989 and the assumption of the presidency by F.W de Klerk, the liberation parties were 
re-legalized, and negotiations to determine the future constitutional settlement of South 
Africa were pursued with varying degrees of success. This culminated in the 1994 
election and appointment of the first ANC government in South Africa.250 
The older segregation laws had been scrapped by the Nationalists in an attempt 
to show their bona fides to the outside world, and to their internal opposition. The three 
main apartheid laws, the Natives Land Act (1913), the Group Areas Act (1950), the 
Population Registration Act (1949), and the restricted franchise stubbornly remained in 
place, as did much of the draconian security legation and censorship laws.251 The 
Homelands were still officially in existence.  
Without the legitimizing context of the Cold War, White South Africa’s need to 
find a settlement looked more pressing than ever. Political prisoners were released, 
including Nelson Mandela. Commenting on these events prominent anti-apartheid 
journalist Allister Sparks observed in 1991 “Verwoerd was right. Concessions don’t 
ease pressure or buy time, and the introduction of piecemeal reforms do introduce 
illogicalities that make it harder to hold one’s ground.”252 President P.W Botha’s 
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“concessions,” the 1983 Constitution and Tricameral Parliament, had backfired in 
spectacular fashion.   
Resistance against the apartheid system was mainly conducted and organized by 
the African National Congress (ANC). Acknowledging the existence of The Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Black 
Consciousness Movement, and these organizations‟ roles in the resistance movement, 
choose to focus on the ANC in this brief description of the struggle against apartheid.253 
Formed in 1912, the ANC became the first non-tribal organization of blacks 
promoting black interests under white rule. Up until the 1940s, the ANC‟s trust in the 
possibility of compromise remained a platform for the organization, resulting in an 
attitude of aloofness, removed from the harsh realities of black people everyday life254. 
The ANC did, however, catch up with the realities, and few years after the Nationalist 
Party came to power the Defiance Campaign was launched, promoting peaceful, but 
forceful resistance against the repressive system. In this campaign, black people were 
urged to dress formally, act politely and behave as if they had the same legal access to 
public facilities as white people. They would sit in white parks, on white benches 
reading their newspapers in peace; they entered the first-class white carriages on public 
transport and used white public toilets. Another widespread form of resistance was the 
refusal to carry identity documents, which led to great problems for the police force, as 
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they did not have facilities to arrest the thousands of people who refused to carry their 
documents255. In 1955, the ANC drafted The Freedom Charter, which claims that: 
“South Africa belongs to everyone who resides within it, either black and white, and 
that no government can justly claim authority on the people unless it is based on the 
will and consent of all the people” ….256 
This cooperative and non-violent agenda was continued until 1961 when 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation” in Zulu, hereafter referred to as MK), a 
semi-independent body of the ANC with a military mission, was formed. It was the 
police force’s relentless violence and continued attacks on the people that was the 
incentive to this change in tactics, and the ANC started a campaign of sabotage led by 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela.257 
 In 1960, seventeen African countries were said to have won their independence 
from colonial rule. This was the year in which more African countries became 
independent than any other year in its history, and the year 1960 went down in memory 
lane as the ‘Year of Africa' or ‘Africa Year.’ At the end of his tour to the African 
continent in the month of February, the then Conservative British Prime Minister in the 
person of Harold Macmillan famously cautioned the South African parliament of a 
"wind of change" raging all over Africa. As the process of decolonization gathered 
momentum on the remaining part of Africa, the ANC, and PAC, the two most viable 
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African nationalist organizations in South Africa, increasingly associated their problems 
with the struggles of fellow Africans against colonialism. Even in South Africa, the 
most industrialized nation in Africa, the opportunity for freedom from the shackles of 
the racist white minority did not look far off. In his address to the December 1959 
Annual Conference of the ANC, its President Chief Albert Lutuli exhorted: “Africa is 
very much astir. She is swift in freeing herself from the bonds of colonialism. The year 
1960 could actually be described as a year of destiny and a new beginning for many 
areas in Africa.”258 
In another vein, the Pan-Africanist Congress similarly associated itself with "the 
progressive forces of African nationalism" some other places in Africa, whereby, as 
outlined in its Manifesto (adopted in April 1959), "the breaking down of the 
protagonists of oppression is a process that not even nuclear power can stop.259 
The Historiography of Black Politics During the Struggle 
         The studies of the annals of black political organizations in existence until the late 
1960s were the ones written by some of the intellectuals of the different opposition 
movements according to the political parties they were sympathetic to. One of their aim 
was to redress the general indifference of the major settler and liberal traditions in the 
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South African historiography to contemporary black politics as a subject matter.260 
Leading work in this regard was the Eddie Roux's Time Longer than Rope, which was 
originally published in the year 1948.261 It was later followed by the Jack and Ray 
Simons’ Class and Color in South Africa which appeared in the year 1969 also in the 
year as the first part of Wilson and Thompson's Oxford History of South 
Africa.262Although it's not strictly academic because of their underlying political aim 
although the Simons' rather called their book "an exercise in political sociology on a 
time scale,” rather than a history.263 All these set of early Marxist works have too often 
been ignored by the next generation of radical historians.264 Some of the questions 
which was introduced by these authors for instance with credence to the subject of race 
and class exploitation and the relationship between national and class struggle in South 
Africa are still much relevant in half a century later. However, the historical period 
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under scrutiny in this study was too recent to be written about by this group of scholar-
activists. 
From the early 1960s, the reappearance of protests of note in South Africa itself 
was equal with a matching concern in social and popular history by a new generation of 
radical-revisionist and by the Marxist-favored historians. In 'From Protest to Challenge', 
the foreword to the 1977 edition of Volume 3 of the impressive documentary which 
chronicled the annals of black revolt in Pretoria between 1882-1964, American scholars 
Karis and Carter while combining both archival material and analytical essays, also 
declared the belief that their work would be "a launch-pad for new generations of 
historians."265Moreover, in the preface to the fifth volume in the series, which seem to 
appeared in the year 1997 and also covers the history of the liberation struggle from its 
nadir in the year 1964 to its resurgence in the year 1979, however readers are told that " 
all these expectations are as telling today as if it were twenty years back."266 With a 
small number of exceptions, such as Tom Lodge’s influential survey of black resistance 
Black Politics in South Africa since 1945.267 It has really in fact been one of the 
shortcomings of the revisionist school that only a few broadly syntheses of South 
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Africa's history have been examined,268 And despite the amplification of many, in-depth 
case studies. Although black political organizations have been regarded in principle as 
key agents of political change and as important mobilizes of social identity by 
revisionist historians, their concern with social history and history ‘from below' – 
Rather than the existing ‘institutional,' history has actually resulted on the whole in a 
localized focus of inquiry. Bernhard Magubane has vehemently debated this point in 
one of the recent critiques of the liberal and revisionist traditions in South Africa's 
historiography:   
When one tends to read all the inputs of the Marxist-influenced 
historians, the rare discourse of the national freedom group and its 
battles strikes one very Forcefully. The banning of the African National 
Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress seems to have recommended 
that the national ambition of Africans was no longer feasible.269 
 
On the other hand, the transition of South Africa's to democracy has helped 
historians, with many of those that participated in the anti-apartheid movement, to 
vehemently write and speak about the past more openly than ever before. As soon as the 
bans on individuals and organizations were gradually lifted after 1990, so there were 
many of the inhibitions which the demands of the struggle and the commitment to 
against the apartheid exacted. The main problem today lies, as historian Shula has 
argued, "in the transformation of South African history from being a morality play 
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whether in its settler version as a narrative of the confrontation between civilization and 
or in its humanitarian version of villains and victims.”270 
The first publication of the foremost volume of the book titled the Road to 
Democracy in South Africa in 2004 has really signified a very important step in this 
direction. All chapters in the volume above provide new and fresh insights into the 
years between 1960-1970 by focusing more on particular organizations, their activities, 
the evolution of their strategies and tactics, as well as those specific events and other 
necessary aspects which shaped and made the decade memorable. Their main aim is to 
challenge "the belief that the 1960s period was a decade of political quiescence.”271 
However, it is actually a shortcoming of the book that the complementary chapters, 
which individually stand mainly on their own, seems not to form a continuous narrative, 
as it is common with collections of this nature. In fact, it could well argue that it was on 
the premises of the accomplishments, as well as of the problems, shortcomings, 
disagreements and the doubts that surfaced at this time, that the freedom groups 
ultimately emerged victorious in the year 1990. 
In particular, it is recommendable that the African National Congress and all its 
allies managed not only to exist one another but were actually able to create a degree of 
unity, purpose, and thrust which in turn allowed the African National Congress to pull 
through one of the fragile periods in its history. The Pan-Africanist Congress in exile, 
was affected by some internal problems which in part overshadowed the message of the 
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political tendency that the organization represented when it was founded in the year 
1959. Despite all these odds, which became evident from the initial stage, the Pan-
Africanist Congress never disappeared from the political scene. The Pan-Africanist 
Congress continued their struggle for survival, however troubled, can in part be laid at 
the feet of its pro-Africanist ideology and the fact it was able to generate interest within 
and without South Africa and at a Pan-African level.272 
The Anc 
This movement was originally called the “South African Native National 
Congress,” the African National Congress was formed in the year 1912 as a platform to 
bring together Africans across what was then regarded as the Union of South Africa into 
a single organization which passed both ‘tribal' and regional differences by promoting a 
spirit of African nationalism. Later In the mid1940s, the socio-economic developments 
unveiled by the Second World War – most essentially African urbanization, 
employment in the secondary sector and as well as the trade union organization – which 
helped bring about a double process of reawakening and radicalization of the African 
National Congress, under the influential impact of its Youth League.           
By turning to non-violent tactics of direct action, the African National Congress 
grew in the following years into a truly mass organization which was now extremely 
steeled up, and hell-bent on achieving full emancipation and citizenship rights for 
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marginalized black South Africans throughout the country as clearly outlined in its 1949 
Program of Action.273 
An Alliance for a Common Cause 
In the early 1950s, the Colored People's Congress (CPC) and the (white) 
Congress of Democrats (COD) were formed to mobilize their respective communities in 
opposition against the government and in support of the African National Congress. 
However, together with the African National Congress, the SAIC and as well as the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), they all came together to constitute 
a large union of forces that came to be recognized as the Congress Alliance. The 
Congress alliance grew out of the principle that the African National Congress, as 
President Lutuli explained, was “prepared to cooperate fully by equality with any 
National or political party or organization, provided they share common aims and 
common methods of achieving our objectives.274   
The Congress Alliance endorsed its manifesto, Freedom Charter, on the 26th of 
June,1955, in Kliptown at the People's Congress.275 The Charter outlined the vision of 
all society that is equal which would be governed in line with the principles of 
economic and social justice. Despite being often cited as evidence of the ANC's non-
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racialism, in which the Freedom Charter actually reflected as multi-racial, rather than 
viewing South Africa as a non-racist and racial, pluralized country of four different 
countries or, to use the term of the Charter, "national groups."276 
The divisions of the African, Indian, Coloured and as well as the white, reflected 
the official categories that were used by the South African government. It was evident 
that the latter did not view all Africans as constituting a single nation, but they further 
subdivided the African population into a variety of smaller, ethnically defined nations. 
This classification system underpinned much of apartheid legislation, as well as the 
Bantustan project. Although this study does not really support the divisions imposed by 
the apartheid state, it does nevertheless make use of the words "African," "Indian," 
"Colored," and "white" as these were how they were named by the freedom group. 
When "black" was mentioned, it is often used in the same way as the post-Soweto 
generation wanted it to refer to African, Colored, and as well as the Indian sections of 
the entire populations collectively. 
The same multi-racial understanding also informed the tactical union of the four, 
racially separate Congresses in the Congress Alliance. The Pan-Africanist Congress was 
established on 6 April 1959 after the internal dissension that occurred within the 
African National Congress led to the collapse of a group popularly known as the 
Africanists, who had been earlier growing more and more disgruntled with the policies 
of the African National Congress. The Three major reasons for the Africanists' 
disagreement can be identified as follows. Firstly, they had been antagonized to the 
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calling off of the 1952 Defiance Campaign by the senior African National Congress 
leadership in January 1953. Second, there was also the issue of cooperation with the 
Indians in the SAIC, and also with the white liberals and as well as the communists in 
the COD. According to them, the African National Congress had earlier came to be 
unduly influenced by the non-Africans within the Congress Alliance, whom they all 
alleged of dictating policy to the African National Congress. And lastly, the they 
claimed that the African National Congress had forsaken the 1949 Program of Action 
and renamed it with the Freedom Charter.277 
The Ideological Shift to Armed Struggle 
In spite of the widespread hope, which seemed to fill the beginning of the 
decade, the year 1960 turned out to be disappointing for the South African liberation 
struggle. The date, however, remained a watershed in the history of South Africa's. Also 
On 21 March 1960, the peaceful anti-pass demonstrations convened by the Pan-
Africanist Congress indeed ceased in the cruel police butcheries of Sharpeville and 
Langa. Both the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, which 
were consequently both declared illegal organizations, agreed to move underground and 
also to embrace armed struggle to confront the South African government's increasing 
ferocity and oppression. Within the next few years, the new draconian legislation was 
introduced which in effect later turned South Africa into a police state. The decade 
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which preceded, on the surface a period of apparent peace, saw the efficient bashing of 
almost every internal political opposition by the apartheid machinery. 278 
The Frontrunner of the Struggle 
              One cannot discuss the ANCs fight against apartheid without including 
Mandela, who together with Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki formed the 
backbone of the resistance movement. Mandela, Tambo, and Sisulu formed the 
Congress Youth League (CYL) in 1944 and paved the way for the mass actions of 
passive resistance mentioned above. Preceding the formation of MK and their sabotage 
actions, Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki were charged with recruitment for guerrilla warfare 
for the purpose of violent revolution furthering the objects of communism, and aiding 
foreign military units when they hit the Republic. They were found guilty on all charges 
and sentenced to life imprisonment. At this time other central figures in the ANC 
leadership were either under banning orders or in exile. Davis (1987) states that it was 
the incarceration of these key executives "virtually beheaded the ANC and the 
organization was shattering.279 Extremely tense and violent years followed with South 
Africa in a state of civil war. During this time, the ANC had to conduct most of its work 
underground; there were great conflicts with other liberation movements, and the 
government did all it could to spark possible tensions to split the resistance. The ANC 
did, however, manage to survive. It gained allies and created a nationwide infrastructure 
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of resistance against the apartheid state, which eventually led to negotiations with the 
apartheid government and democratic elections in 1994.280 
As the 1980’s was coming to an end local and international pressure on the 
apartheid government, as well as the realization that apartheid could neither be 
maintained by force forever, nor overthrown by the opposition without considerable 
suffering, both sides came to the negotiating table. The first meeting between Mandela 
and the National Party government came while P.W Botha was President; however, 
they made little progress.281 Botha had declared that apartheid was dead, but he never 
rejected the policy of white supremacy; it thus follows that the common grounds for 
negotiations were limited.282 In 1989, W.F. de Klerk was elected the new State 
President, and in his first address to parliament, he transformed South Africa by lifting 
the ban on the ANC and other banned organizations and political parties, and releasing 
Mandela from prison.283  
In the following years, negotiations continued, but were steadily threatened by 
grave eruptions of violence, resulting in the ANC leaving the negotiation table accusing 
De Klerk's government of complicity in the Boipatong massacre where people were 
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killed284. They re-entered negotiations, but experienced another breakdown with the 
assassination of "Chris" Hani, leader of the SACP. This country was brought to the 
brink of disaster, but was able to ultimately prove a turning point, after which the major 
parties pushed for a settlement with increased determination. The assassination of Hani 
is more often considered as an event, which really led to a shift of power in favor of the 
African National Congress because of Nelson Mandela’s who is said to be handling the 
situation. He addressed the nation appealing for calm, in a speech regarded as 
'presidential' even though he was then not president of the country285:   
This day an unforgivable sin has been committed, A man full of 
passion, of unsurpassed courage, has been killed in his prime. Chris Hani 
is known to all of us, loved by millions, hated only by those who are 
scared of the truth, Chris Hani had well supported the quest for peace, 
combing the nook and cranny of South Africa calling for a spirit of 
tolerance among our citizens. Our country is mourning. Our hurt and 
indignation are real. We mustn't allow ourselves be provoked by those 
who seek to deny us the very freedom Chris Hani gave his life for. 
African National Congress dips its banner in salute to this outstanding 
son of Africa.286  
On April 27, 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections. The entire 
police force and the military were ready to handle any disruption that might occur and 
damage this new beginning in the history of South Africa. They were left with nothing 
to do; despite the long lines of people waiting for hours to cast their vote, the elections 
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were conducted peacefully and resulted in the African National Congress polling 62% 
of the vote, and which made Nelson Mandela became the president, with De Klerk and 
Thabo Mbeki as his deputies. However, the National Party, also with 20% of the vote, 
joined the African National Congress in a Government of National Unity287. 
The Transitional politics commenced again after the election, with which a new 
constitution was finally agreed upon in the year 1995.                                                    
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
The inconsistencies in the American foreign policy contributed to the longevity 
of apartheid. For almost fifty years, apartheid thrived in South Africa as the minority 
whites controlled the affairs of the southern African nation while maligning the black 
majority, and committing great fundamental human rights crimes in the process. 
Virtually all the American presidents who were in power during the apartheid regime in 
South Africa refused to see apartheid as a fundamental problem, but an opportunity for 
an alliance in the cold war and the war against communism. The country's precious 
minerals, its prime strategic location, its government's role as a staunch supporter of 
American and the West's policy of blocking the growth of Soviet communism were the 
several excuses cited by previous United States presidencies for encouraging the 
National Party of South Africa and its policies in Pretoria.  
This support continued until Apartheid's ultimate demise two years after Reagan 
left office. It is easy to say that the U.S. decision to support Pretoria was in the interest 
of the United States of America. In spite of the concerns for the indignity, pains, and 
sufferings experienced by the sheer vast numbers of the South African citizenry meted 
out by the apartheid regime; the U.S. government continuously appealed the U.N. and 
the world that Apartheid would peter out naturally.  
 In conclusion, it is essential to briefly describe the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) as it contributed to making South Africa’s transition to democracy 
something out of the ordinary. The TRC was established in 1995 and intended to serve 
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as the instrument through which South Africa would come to grips with its 
discriminatory past and allow for a peaceful transition to democracy. The underlying 
assumption that the TRC’s work was based on is that understanding history by letting 
perpetrators narrate their politically motivated crimes will aid in the creation of a more 
peaceful and democratic future. In hindsight, there is disagreement on how successful 
the TRC was. It was no doubt a very bold venture, consuming vast amounts of 
resources by holding hundreds of hearings, interviewing thousands of victims of 
apartheid, granting amnesty to nearly a thousand human rights violators, and producing 
a massive final report288.  
For further reading on the TRC process, I strongly recommend Country of My 
Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa by Antjie 
Krog, which is a gripping document on the national healing process that took place in 
South Africa in the first years after 1994. André Brink, professor of English language 
and literature at the University of Cape Town and acclaimed author, is quoted on the 
back cover of this book: "It's quite essential to note that trying to carefully comprehend 
the new South Africa without the Truth and the Reconciliation Commission would be 
fruitless; trying to comprehend the Commission and not relating to this book would 
really be irresponsible."  
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         According to many, the truth and reconciliation process was exceptionally 
successful, believing that it prevented South Africa from erupting in a racially based 
civil war. According to Gibson, South Africans themselves are not so full of hope about 
the process, because many tend to complain more that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission erupted racial tensions in the country by exposing the evil deeds of both 
the then apartheid government and its agents and as well as the liberation forces. Some 
were firmly against the conjecture that truth can somehow lead to reconciliation, 
claiming instead that uncovering the details about the scary events of the past only hurt 
people, making them far less likely to be willing to adapt with the new democratic 
regime. Indeed, respite to my vivid observations of the South African media, complaints 
and condemnations of the truth and reconciliation process seem too far outcasted 
laudatory assessments289.   
Gibson adds that social scientists should be more agnostic about the TRC 
process and that it is remarkable how little systematic investigation has been conducted 
into whether or not the TRC succeeded in its objectives290. The TRC achieved insofar as 
the emotionally injured people of South Africa experienced that they were healed and 
could move on with their lives. It is, however, hard to tell how many this applies to. Did 
all those involved in the hearings and interviews experience this healing? How 
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extensive was the symbolic effect of the TRC? These are questions one can hopefully 
gain answers to after thorough sociological research. For the formerly oppressed South 
Africans, to most, the TRC has had a limited effect, and many will point to statistics of 
violent crime291 in South Africa, which is a particular sign that many hearts and minds 
still need to be healed. 
 South Africa became an epitome of conflict negotiation in the eyes of the world 
after apartheid was finally laid to rest. Reveling in this achievement, the ANC 
journeyed around the world, getting the recognition they deserved along the way.292 
According to the historian R.W. Johnson, the absolute wonder was not that the 
embattled former apartheid nation attained constitutional status, it was the way they 
achieved it. Mounting pressure on F.W. de Klerk, the National Party leader led the 
minority white to give up power peacefully, and without bloodshed.293 
President Nelson Mandela who successfully reconciled the blacks and the white 
minority, announced a 100 Days Plan to be put into practice immediately after his 
inauguration.294 The 100 Days Plan did not work out well as a result of improper 
planning, and lack of funds. It was a complete disaster, as there were no staffed clinics 
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and hospital.295 Fast forward to 2001, and HIV/AIDS had become a real menace. Up to 
5,000 infected patients were dying of the hazard per week, and it soon increased to 
1,000 patients losing the battle against HIV/AIDS in a day.296 The better life that South 
Africans saw for themselves post-apartheid soon became a mirage. Johnson writes, “life 
was not only not better for all, for too many, but it was also shorter, and poorer. Signs of 
social distress proliferated. Crime rates soared.”297Apartheid had eaten so much into the 
fabric of the country that no immediate policy could set things right. It became too 
overwhelming for even the excellent duo of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki to fix. 
Blacks especially still could not live the life they expected. President Nelson Mandela 
set himself three goals to pursue, namely; the harmony of the state, the security of the 
land, and the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Program.298The 
president delegated almost everything else to his able deputy, Thabo Mbeki, who loathe 
to work with the Reconstruction Development Program coordinator, as he was a 
stubborn man not given to anyone’s opinion but his alone.299  
        The Mandela government met the best run, most efficient water system in Africa, 
yet was faced with the harsh reality of dealing with the supply of water to squatter 
camps and the black communities, an area the apartheid government failed to allocate 
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water to during the segregation years.300 The new government in a bid to arrest the 
development decided to adopt the idea of Kader Asmal, a minister in Mandela’s 
cabinet, who came up with a new “water schemes” to be bankrolled by the Independent 
Development Trust, an idea completely rivaled and contested by several water resources 
experts in the country.301These specialists and other experienced officials were sure that 
the plan would not work, and warned the government against it. The project did not 
work out as well as other development projects by the Mandela administration. It 
proved too complicated, too late for the frail Mandela who could not do much with the 
power he had.302 
       South Africa today has naturally developed since the Mandela administration but 
still face inherent problems that can be traced back to apartheid. Jacob Zuma, the 
incumbent president of the former apartheid state, believes that the country’s woes can 
be laid at the feet of apartheid and colonialism.303 The segregation education laws, 
Bantu education, are some of the roots of the socio-economic challenges present-day 
South Africa faces, and according to Jacob Zuma, colonialism and apartheid are the 
reason the country still battles with a low standard in education, poverty, and 
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unemployment.304 The transition to running a democratic nation is still a problem 
because of the legacies of apartheid. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
304 SA News (2014) Zuma upbeat about SA’s future, despite challenges (online), 
available:http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/zuma-upbeat-about-sas-future-despite-
challenges [14 February 2014] ) (Accessed February 17, 2018) 
125 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
12 South Africa-The Impact of World War II. “The Great Depression and the 1930s.     
N.p., n.d.” Web. 5 May 2014. www.123helpme.com. 
A . Kuin'a Ndumbe III. “Black Africa and Germany during the Second World War.” 
Report and papers of the symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and  Cultural Organization, 1985, 63. 
Address of President Jimmy Carter before the United States Naval Academy, 
Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, 7 June 1978. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30915&st=annapolis
&st1= 
African National Congress Freedom Charter 1995, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html.  
African National Congress (1993): Address to the nation by African National 
Congress President, N.R. Mandela, on the assassination of Chris Hani. 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1993/sp930410.html. 
Ali.A Mazrui. Africa and the legacy of the Second World War: political, economic 
and cultural aspects. Report and papers of the symposium organized by 
Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 10 to 13 November 1980. 
Paris, United  Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
1985, 13-14. 
Allen, John. Apartheid South Africa: An Insider's View of the Origin and Effects of 
Separate Development. New York: IUniverse Inc, 2005. 
126 
 
 
 
Amneh Daoud Badran, Zionist Israel and Apartheid South Africa: Civil society and 
Peace - building in Ethnic-National States. London: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2010. 
ANC (1992): Statement of the emergency meeting of the National Executive 
Committee of  the ANC.  
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1992/links/pr920623.h
tml.   
Andrew J. DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil rights ambassador. Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources, 2003. 
Another relevant work which was authored by John Burger (pseudonym of Leo 
Marquand), The Black Man's Burden (London, 1943). For a non-Marxist 
interpretation see Jordan Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (London, 
1963). 
Arianna Lissoni, “The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970,” 
Phd. the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 
January 2008. http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/south-african-
liberation-movements-exile-c-1945-1970-arianna-lissoni. 
B.Davidson. Africa and the Second World War. Report and papers of the 
symposium organized by Unesco at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 
10 to 13 November 1980. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, 1985,109. 
127 
 
 
Baker, H. Pauline. The United States, and South Africa: The Reagan Years New York: 
Ford Foundation, 1989. 
Berger, Iris. South Africa in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
Borstelmann, Thomas. Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern 
Africa in the Early Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Byrnes, Rita M. (1996). "Legislative Implementation of Apartheid". South Africa: A 
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.za accessed June 9 2017. 
Cable, U.S. Embassy-Vienna to State, 20 May 1977. Facsimile published in 
Mokoena, ed.  Declassified history. Document 
Chester A. Crocker, Southern Africa: Eight Years Later "Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, No. 
4 (Fall, 1989), pp. 144-164"Published by: Council on Foreign Relations 
Christian M. De Vos, "Balancing Acts: John Kennedy, The Cold War, and The African 
National Congress," Politikon 32, no. 1 (May 2005), 119. Accessed June 11 
2017,http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0258934050010178
2. 
Clarizio, Lynda M., Bradley Clements, and Erika Geetter. "United States Policy 
toward South Africa." Human Rights Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1989): 249-94. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/761958. Accessed June 29, 2017. 
Coker, Christopher. The United States, and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive 
Engagement and Its Critics. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986. 
 
128 
 
 
Cornwell, Rupert. “Cyrus Vance.” The Independent 14 January 2002. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/cyrus-vance-
729665.html .15 June 2009. 
Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change." Foreign Affairs 59, no. 2 
(1980): 323-51.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040728, Accessed August 
21, 2017. 
Darryl, M. Trimiew. God Bless the Child that's Got its Own. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1997. 
David B. Ottaway, Carter arrives in Nigeria on state visit. Washington Post. 1 April 
1978. A1.  
Prior to Carter’s state visit, Franklin D. Roosevelt made an informal trip to Liberia 
on 26–27 January 1943, where he met President Edwin Barclay. FDR was 
en route from the Allies’ Casablanca Conference of 14–24 January 1943. 
David R Penna “Apartheid, The Law and Reform in South Africa” in Africa Today 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (1990): 5-21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186650 
David, Forsythe. The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and 
Outward. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 
Davidson and Irina Filatova. “African History: A View From Behind the Kremlin 
Wall,” in Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters, ed. 
Maxim Mtusevich. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007. 
129 
 
 
Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?  How Reagan’s Administration Tried to 
support South Africa without appearing to Endorse Apartheid. Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2007. 
Davis, M. Stephen. The Bush Presidency, and South Africa: Congress and The 
Sanctions Outlook. Braamfontein 2017. The South African Institute of 
International  Affairs Jan Smuts House, May 1989. 
Deegan, Heather. The Politics of the new South Africa: Apartheid and after. Harlow: 
Longman, 2001. 
DOI: 10.2307/20044114, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044114 
Dubrow, Saul. Apartheid 1948-1994. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Dugard, Haysom, and Gilbert Marcus. The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in 
South  Africa. Michigan: Ford Foundation, 1992. 
Eisenberg, Rebecca Nicole, "Reexamining the Global Cold War in South Africa: Port 
Usage,  Space Tracking and Weapons Sales" (2012). Dissertations and 
Theses. Paper 117.http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/117 
10.15760/etd.117.  
Gibson, L. James. Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? New 
York: Russell Sage, 2006. 
Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
Gordimer and David Goldblatt. Lifetimes: Under Apartheid. Michigan: Knopf, 1986. 
Governor Jimmy Carter inaugural address, Atlanta, Georgia. January 12, 1971, 
www.carterlibrary.org. 
130 
 
 
Graham, Matthew (2010), Cold War in Southern Africa, in: Africa Spectrum, 45, 1, 
131-139. http://journals.giga 
hamburg.de/index.php/afsp/article/view/511/368 
H.J. and R.E. Simons. Class and Colour in South Africa. 1850-1950. London: Penguin, 
1969. 
Hayward, Steven. The Real Jimmy Carter: How Our Worst Ex-President Undermines 
American Foreign Policy. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004. 
Herbert, and Alexej Ugrinsky. Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential 
Years Connecticut:  Greenwood, 1994. 
Ike, and Rissik, Dee. Cultures of the World: South Africa. New York: Marshall 
Cavendish, 2004. 
Iliffe, John. Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
J.E. Spence, “Southern Africa in the Cold War,” History Today 49, no. 2 (Feb 1999) 
http://www.historytoday.com/je-spence/southern-africa-cold-war. 
James, Barber. South Africa in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd, 1999. 
John Daniel, "Racism, the Cold War and South Africa's Regional Security Strategies 
1948- 1990," Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation. 
John de St. Jorre, “South Africa: Is Change Coming?,” Foreign Affairs (Fall, 1981): 
112, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1981-09-01/south-
africa-change-coming (accessed September 14, 2011) 
131 
 
 
John Parsons, “On Constructive Engagement in South Africa,” Tech, November 5, 
1985.  http://tech.mit.edu/V105/N47/parson.47o.html (accessed 
September 8,  2017). 
John, and Michael Lewis. Africa: Washington: National Geographic Society, 2001. 
Justin Elliott, “Reagan‟s Embrace of Apartheid South Africa, 
“https://www.salon.com/2011/02/05/ronald_reagan_apartheid_south_afri
cca 
Kaja Kathrine Kristiansen, The Professional Identity of Black South African 
Teachers Personal and professional struggles in a disjunction between policy 
and practice, Master Thesis, Faculty of Education, Institute for Educational 
Research, University of Oslo December 2008.12. 
Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 3, (Stanford, Hoover Institution 
Press,  1972) xv. 
Karis and Gail M. Gerhart. Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, in Thomas Karis and 
Gwendolen M. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary 
History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Vol. 3. Stanford: 
Indiana University Press, 1977. 
Kotze D.A. African Politics in South Africa 1964-1974: Parties and Issues. London: C. 
Hurst & Co., 1975. 
Kristiansen, Tomm W. (1996). Mandela's Land. En fortelling om frihet. Oslo: J.W. 
Capellens Forlag. 
Krog, Antjie. Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the 
New South Africa. New York, Broadway, 1998. 
132 
 
 
Lauren Peacock, National Ideas or National Interest: New Zealand and South 
Africa, 1981- 1994, University of Wellington 2013,95. 
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3368/T
hesis.pdf?sequence=2. 
Lee Ray, James. American Foreign Policy, and Political Ambition. Los Angeles: Sage, 
2014. 
Letter, Vorster to Carter, 23 March 1977. Document 1. Southern Africa (3/77–
4/77).  Geographic File: Box 14. Brzezinski Collection. JCL. 
Linda Freeman. "Constructively‟ Supporting Aggression and Repression - Reagan's 
South Africa Policy," Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue 
Canadienne des Études Africaines 18, no. 3 (November 1984): 627, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/484775. 
Lodge, Tom. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. London: Longman, 1983. 
Lulat, Y.G-M. United States Relations with South Africa:  A Critical Overview from the 
Colonial Period to the Present. New York: Peter Lang, 2008. 
Lyman N. Princeton. Partner to History: The U.S Role in South Africa’s Transition to 
democracy. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 
Massie, Robert. Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years. New York: Bantam, 1997. 
Memo, Mondale to Carter, 8 April 1977. 2. Document 14. Southern Africa (3/77–
4/77).  Geographic File: Box 14. Brzezinski Collection. JCL. 
Michael Clough, “Southern Africa:  Challenges and Choices,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 
5 (Summer, 1988): 1068, 
133 
 
 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/angola/1988-06-01/southern-
africa-challenges-and-choices. 
Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa, 
Vol.1,  South Africa to 1870, and Vol. 2, 1870-1966 (Oxford, 1969-1971). 
Leo Kuper's chapter in volume two (426-476) this was really the only 
contribution to the collection sacrificed to the history of African nationalism 
in South Africa. In the South African edition, even this was excluded from its 
publication. 
Morris, Roger, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy 
New York: Harper Collins, August 1977. 
On U.S.A. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on 
South Africa,  A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Report (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1987). 
Onslow, Sue. Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power Black Liberation. New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Peffer, John. Art and the End of Apartheid. Minneapolis London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009. 
Peter and Lh Gann. Hope for South Africa? California: Hoover Institution Press, 
1991.  
Mandelbaum, Michael. Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War 
Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
134 
 
 
Peter J. Schraeder. United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, 
Crisis, and Change. Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, January 
1994. 
Polakow-Suransky, Sasha. The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with 
Apartheid South Africa. New York: Random House Books, 2010. 
Pomeroy, J. Williams, Apartheid, Imperialism, and African Freedom. New York: 
International  Publishers, 1986. 
Presidential Address to the 47th Annual Conference of the African National 
Congress, Durban, 12 December 1959, 
http://www.anc.org.za/content/47th-national-conference-presidential-
address-chief-albert-luthuli. 
Presidential news conference, 15 April 1977. DSB. 1977, 76(1976), 459. 
R. W Johnson. South Africa’s Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since The End 
of Apartheid. New York: Overlook, 2010). 
Rita Byrnes, South Africa: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the U.S. 
Library of Congress), http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.za 
Ross, Robert. A Concise History of South Africa. Cambridge: University Press 1997, 
2008. 
Rotberg, I. Robert. Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy. Cambridge, World Peace 
Foundation, 2002. 
Roux, Edward. Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for 
Freedom in South Africa. London, V. Gollancz, 1948. 
135 
 
 
SA News (2014) Zuma upbeat about SA’s future, despite challenges. 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/zuma-upbeat-about-sas-future-
despite-challenges. 
SADET (eds.), The Road to Democracy, Vol. 1: 1960-1970. Cape Town: Struik 
Publishers, 2005. 
Samia Kouki, The Jimmy Carter And Ronald Reagan Administrations’ Policies 
Toward Apartheid South Africa: Diverging Rhetoric, Converging Actions, 
The Tunis Languages Higher Institute, Tunisia, International Journal of Arts 
& Sciences, 2011. 
Sandy, Vogelgsang. American Dream Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human 
Rights  Policy. New York: W Norton & Co Inc., 1980. 
Schroeder A. Richard.  Africa After Apartheid: South Africa, Race, and Nation in 
Tanzania. Indiana: University Press 2012. 
Seegers, Annette. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. New York: 
Tauris  Academic Studies,1996. 
Shandrá D. Hipp. Constructive Engagement: Ronald Reagan‟S Problematic Policy of 
Appeasement With South Africa. Georgetown University: Washington, D.C., 
2012. 
Shubin, Vladimir. “Beyond the Fairy Tales: The Reality of Soviet Involvement in the 
Liberation of Southern Africa,” in Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three 
Centuries of Encounters, ed. Maxim Matusevich. Trenton: Africa World Press, 
Inc., 2007. 
136 
 
 
Shula Marks, “Rewriting South African history: or The hunt for Hintsa’s head,” in 
Simon  McGrath, Charles Jedrej, Kenneth King, and Jack Thompson (eds.), 
Rethinking African History (Edinburgh, 1997. 
South Africa-The Impact of World War II, www.123helpme.com. 
Sparks, Allister. The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of 
Apartheid.London: Mandarin, 1991. 
Stephen, M. Davis. Apartheid‘s Rebels: Inside South Africa‘s Hidden War. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1989. 
Stock, Robert. Africa South of the Sahara. New York and London: The Guilford 
Press, 1995. 
Stultz, Newell M. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 35, no. 2/3 
(2002): 518-20. doi:10.2307/3097652 
The cold war: accessed 26th of April 2017, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-
History/The-Cold- War.aspx 
The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation, and Apartheid, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford, 2000); Robert Ross, A Concise History of South Africa (Cambridge, 
1999); William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, rev. ed. (Oxford, 
2001). 
Thompson, Leonard. A History of South Africa, Revised Edition. New Haven: Yale 
University, 1999. 
Thomson, Alex. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa: 1948-1994: 
Conflict of Interests. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
137 
 
 
Tutu Denounces Raegan “New York Times” July 23, 1986. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/tutu-denounces-reagan.html 
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical years in America's foreign policy New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983. 
Vandenbosch, Amry. South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid. 
Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015. 
VasiliMitrokhin and Christopher Andrew. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB 
and the Battle for the Third World. New York: Basic Books, 2005. 
Veit Erlmann. Migration and Performance: Zulu Migrant Workers' Isicathamiya 
Performance  in South Africa, 1890-1950. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
2014. 
Vice President Walter Mondale’s news conference, Vienna, 20 May 1977.  DSB. 
1977,  76(1982), 665. 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-Building and Human 
Rights. Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
  
138 
 
 
VITA 
OLUGBENGA SAMSON OJEWALE 
 
Education: Master of Arts in History, 2018. 
East Tennessee State University,  
Johnson City, TN 
 
Bachelor of Science, Politics and International 
Relations, 2008 
 Lead City University Ibadan, Nigeria 
 
Professional Experience: Teaching Assistant, January 2015-2018 
Department of History, East Tennessee State 
University, Johnson City, TN 
 
Professional training and Certification in Public 
Relations, Institute of Public Policy, Nigeria, 
January 2010 
 
Outreach and Associations:   Vice President SOA (Shades of Africa) – ETSU 
 
 MUN (Model United Nations) – ETSU chapter 
 
Awarded Community Leader for outstanding 
corp member volunteer achievement 
 
